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RESOLVING HEALTH CARE CONFLICTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OFJUDICIAL AND HOSPITAL
RESPONSES

JANET L. DOLGINt

I. INTRODUCTION

n 1976, Chief Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey ("SCNJ") suggested in In re Quinlan'-acase involving
a life and death decision for a patient without capacity-that
comparable cases would be more appropriately handled by
hospital "Ethics Committee [s]" than by courts of law.' Such
committees were understood, even in 1976, as interdisciplinary
bodies "composed of physicians, social workers, attorneys, and

t. Jack and Freda Dicker Distinguished Professor of Health Care Law, Maurice A.
Deane School of Law at Holstra University; Professor of Science Education, Donald and
Barbara Zucker School of Medicine at Hofstra/Northwell; Co-director, Hofstra Biocthics
Center; Director, Gitenstein Institute for Health Law and Policy. I am grateful to Drs.
Mitchell Adler, Renee McCleod, and Sam Packer who read earlier versions of this article.
Their suggestions were invaluable. Further, I thank Jean Krebs (joint degree student in
law and public health, Hofstra University, class of 2020) for her intelligent research
assistance. I am also thankful to Isaac Samuels, Reference Librarian, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University for his help identifying and locating bibliographic
references and to Professor Courtney Selby, Associate Dean for Information Services,
Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law.
Her knowledge and generosity have been invaluable to this project Finally, I thank
Jennifer Calautti, Executive Secretary, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, for her consistent
help.
1. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
2. Id. at 668-69. Justice Hughes opined that the "practice of applying to a court to
confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate ...
because that would be a
gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence" and
"because it would be impossibly cumbersome." Id. at 669. This article concurs with Justice
Hughes's suggestion that such cases generally are better handled (at least initially) by
ethicists within hospitals (either as members of an ethics committee or as part of an ethics
consult service), though for somewhat different reasons than Justice Hughes delineates.
See infra Part II (discussing the roles that ethics committees and courts play in similar
cases).
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theologians" that responded to health care conflicts' within
hospitals and other health care facilities.
When the SCNJ rendered its decision in Quinlan, few
hospitals housed such committees.' That is no longer the case.'
Within a few decades after Quinlan, ethics committees and consult
services 7 began to proliferate in the United States.' By 2007, they
could be found or were being developed in ninety-five percent of
U.S. hospitals.' Justice Hughes's decision in Quinlan may have
encouraged that development.'
This article supports Justice Hughes's preference that
ethics consultations or committees, (depending on the scope of
each in a particular institution)" rather than courts of law, should
respond, at least initially, to bioethical disputes within hospitals.
But that support comes with a confounding caveat: there is a
continuing and significant need for court review-especially
appellate court review-of cases occasioned by health care
conflicts.1 2 That court review serves needs that cannot be similarly
served by ethics committees or consultants.

3.

The phrase "health-care conflicts" was used by Rita Charon. See ARTHUR W.

FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER 155 (2d ed. 2013) (quoting Rita Charon, Narrative
Contributions to Medical Ethics: Recognition, Formulation, Interpretation, and Validation in the
Practice of the Ethicist, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S. BIoETHICs 260, 260

(Edwin R. DuBose et al. cds., 1994)).
4. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A
Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8-9 (1975)).
5. In the early 1980s, only a small percent of hospitals in the U.S. had established
ethics committees or consult services. See Charity Scott, Ethics Consultations and Conflict
Engagement in Health Care, 15 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICT RESOL. 363, 365 (2014) [hereinafter

Charity Scott] (noting a significant increase in the percent of hospitals with ethics
committees between the early 1980s and the 2000s).

6.

Id.

7.

See infra Part II.B (defining ethics committees and ethics consultation services).

8.

Charity Scott, supra note 5, at 365.

9.

Id.

10.

George Annas & Michael Grodin, Hospital Ethics Committees, Consultants, and

Courts, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 554, 554-55 (2016), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sit
es/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-05/sectl-1605.pdf.
11.

Ethics

committees and ethics consult services may differ from each other,

depending on the institution in which they were shaped. See infra Part II.B (considering
ethics committees and ethics consult services).
12.

See Annas & Grodin, supra note 10, at 554 (arguing that ethics committees "do

best when they stick to clinical ethics and leave legal questions to a hospital's attorney and
the courts"); infra Part IV (reviewing the comparative advantages and disadvantages of

responses to health care conflicts within hospitals through the assistance of an ethics
consult service with resolution of similar cases in courts of law).
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The availability of court review-the option for disgruntled
stakeholders in a health care conflict to take their case to court-is
an important, perhaps essential, adjunct to the work of ethics
committees and ethics consult services." Additionally, appellate
court review of cases presenting bioethical challenges shapes and
re-shapes jurisprudential frames within which ethicists (as well as
trial court judges) consider and respond to bioethical
conundrums in hospitals and other health care settings."
Ironically, given Justice Hughes's plea that such cases should be
entertained outside of courtrooms, the SCNJs decision in Quinlan
demonstrates the potential effectiveness and far-reaching benefits
of appellate court review in such cases." In Quinlan, Justice
Hughes developed an influential model to which courts and
health care institutions look to in considering cases involving
surrogate decision-making about end-of-life questions for patients
without capacity." Appellate court decisions in other cases that

involved a wide variety of bioethical conundrums have been
similarly consequential for the development of bioethics as a field
of study and as a frame within which to shape clinical responses.' 7
The cases reviewed in this article-some decided by ethics
consultants and some by courts-illustrate the limitations of court
review compared to the review of ethics consult services in
13.

See Norman L. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying

Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 243 n.2 (1977) (arguing that while "a court should
probably not be involved in individual termination decisions, questions of the legality of
withholding or withdrawing life-preserving care are constantly lurking in hospitals and
would inevitably surface in the courts, whether through homicide, malpractice, or life
insurance litigation. The law must eventually fix decisionmaking responsibility and
criteria.").
14. See Harold L. Hirsch & Richard E. Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-Legal
Implications of In Re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 267, 267 (1977) (discussing the impact
the principles enunciated in Quinlanwill have on physicians).
15. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (naming Karen Ann Quinlan's father as
her guardian and surrogate decision maker and permitting him to authorize termination
of respiratory support for Karen).

16.

See Annas & Grodin, supra note 10, at 554. Interestingly, Dr. Fred Plum, who

testified in the Quinlancase, was one of two scientists who proposed the term "persistent
vegetative state," in the same decade in which Quinlan was decided. Lawrence K. Altman,
Fred Plum, Neurologist Who Helped Coin 'Persistent Vegetative State,' Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES

(June 12, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/health/I3plum.html.
17. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (shaping informed
consent doctrine); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001)
(precluding human subject research involving healthy children subject to health risks as a
result of participation in the research); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
(creating model for resolution of disputes about fate of frozen embryos).
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satisfactorily resolving individual cases raising bioethical dilemmas
within hospital settings.'" Yet, comparing these cases also
highlights the significance of court review, including the role
courts can play in crafting legal and social responses to bioethical
challenges. 9 Thus, although this article agrees with Justice
Hughes that, as a general matter, bioethical disputes are best
entertained by ethics bodies created within health care facilities, it
also concludes that court review can be essential in the
development of bioethical theory and practice. Court review can
also encourage society more generally to reflect on and sometimes
reshape deeply ingrained assumptions about personhood and
relationships.
This article examines two categories of ethics consult
cases 2 0 and compares them with "matching cases" decided by
courts.2 ' The first category of cases involves pregnant patients.
23
The second category involves new born babies and infants. Prior
to beginning research, the hypothesis for this article was that the
comparative benefits and disadvantages of review by ethics
consultants within hospitals, on the one hand, and by judges, on
the other hand, would vary with the issues at stake in the cases. In
fact, few differences emerged in the responses of ethics
consultants to the two categories of cases examined-the few
subtle differences that did emerge 24 do not justify the conclusion
that ethics consultants are more adept at handling one category of
However, significant differences
cases compared to another.
18.

See infra Part IV (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of resolution by

ethics consult service with resolution of similar cases in courts of law).

19.
20.

See id.
A third category of cases, focused on issues surrounding death, dying, and

patients with very serious medical conditions, is expected to be the subject of an article
offering a similar comparison to that offered in this article between the work of ethicists

in hospitals and the work of courts in resolving bioethical conflicts.
21. The phrase "matching cases" refers to cases that were occasioned by similar
health care conflicts.
22. See infra Part 1I.
23. See infra Part Ill.
24. The consultants were more directive in the cases involving pregnant women than
in those involving neonates. This difference was subtle. Further, the number of cases is
too small to draw any general conclusions.
25. The identity of the particular ethicists working within any one hospital may also
affect the committee or ethics consult service's responses to various sorts of cases. Since
the ethics reports considered in this article all stem from the work of one ethics consult
service, no general claim can be made about ethics review with regard to differences in
responses to various sorts of conflicts within hospital and other health care settings.
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between ethics consult review and court review-beyond the most
obvious differences-became apparent in the comparison
between the two. Those differences are delineated and analyzed
throughout this article.
Part I of this article describes the scope of the research
underlying the article's analysis. It then reviews the development
and operation of ethics committees and ethics consult services in
hospitals in the United States in the last several decades. Part II
focuses on health care conflicts between pregnant women and
clinicians or hospital administrators, and Part III examines cases
involving conflicts about the care of seriously ill neonates and
infants. Parts II and III compare matching cases considered by
hospital ethics consultants and by judges. Finally, Part IV of this
article compares the advantages and disadvantages of responses to
health care conflicts within hospitals through the assistance of an
ethics consult service with resolution of similar cases in courts of
law. Part V offers a conclusion to this article.
II. SCOPE OF THE PROJECT: ETHICS COMMIrrEES, ETHICS
CONSULTATION SERVICES, AND COURTS

This Part delineates the scope of the analysis described in
this article. In Section A, it suggests a need for caution about
generalizing the article's conclusions to all ethics consult services
or all courts. Then, Section B offers a summary of the character of
ethics consult services and ethics committees in hospitals and
reviews their development in the U.S. Section B also reviews
differences in professional presumptions among those working in
law, medicine, and bioethics, and suggests the importance of
developing methods for those working in each realm to
communicate more robustly with those in the others. This may
involve collaborative relationships between ethics consult services,
a hospital's legal department, palliative care, social work, and
chaplaincy, among others.
A. Scope of the Project
The ethics cases analyzed in this article arose at a large
urban hospital in the Northeast, referred to in this article as
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"Brookside." 6 Each case was summarized by an ethics consultant
in a written report." Almost all of Brookside's ethics consultations
included several ethicists, one of whom was almost always a Fellow,
working alongside a more seasoned bioethicist with professional
training in nursing, medicine, or law.2 1 In addition to the ethics
2
consult service, Brookside has several ethics committees. ' At
Brookside, the consult service responds to cases involving
individual patients, and the ethics committees review cases,
including cases already reported on by the consult service.so In
addition, ethics committees may examine and make suggestions
about hospital policy regarding bioethical issues and undertake
educational activities." At other hospitals, these tasks may be
distributed in a different manner or the ethics committee may be
responsible for both sets of tasks.
The analysis offered in this article depends on qualitative
assessment of texts. In comparing the work of ethicists to the work
of courts in responding to the conflicts at issue, this article
suggests that ethics consultants offer an important alternative to
court deliberations and often should be preferred to court review
in response to health care conflicts within hospitals.

26.

This article considers ethics consult reports written between the start of 2012 and

the first week of October 2017. Research for this article relied on de-identified reports.
Sometimes even the gender of stakeholders had to be assumed. That was not always the
case, however, as in cases involving pregnant patients. Almost each review of an ethics case

in this article involved some changes in detail in order to make it less likely that a patient,
clinician, or other stakeholder could be re-identified.
27. See generally Medical Ethics Consultation Report, Nassau University Medical
Center (2012) (Pregnancy Case P20122) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pregnancy
Case P20122]; Medical Ethics Consultation Report at 1, North Shore-Long Island Jewish
Health-System (2012)(Pregnancy Case P20123) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Pregnancy Case P20123]; Medical Ethics Consultation Report, Northwell Health (2017)
(Infant Case 120171) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Infant Case 120171]; Medical
Ethics Consultation Report, North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System (2013)
(Infant Case 120138) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Infant Case 120138]; Medical
Ethics Consultation Report, North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System (2012)
(Infant Case 120124) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Infant Case 120124].
28. See id.
29. Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Judith Hendrick, Legal Aspects of Clinical Ethics Committees, 27 J. MED. ETHICS
i50, i51 (2001) (identifying "three main functions" of clinical ethics committees as
"education, policy development and case review").
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B. Ethics Committees and Ethics Consultations
In 2011, a task force of the American Society for Bioethics
and Humanities ("ASBH") identified "core competencies" that
should be required of all bioethics consultants: "skills, knowledge,
and attributes" needed "to perform competently."" The task
force's report defined a "health care ethics consultation" as "a set
of services provided by an individual or group in response to
questions from patients, families, surrogates, healthcare
professionals, or other involved parties who seek to resolve
uncertainty or conflict regarding value-laden concerns that
emerge in healthcare." 3 4

The great majority of U.S. hospitals and nursing homes
now include ethics committees and/or ethics consult services (or
have access to such services)." A slew of factors-some internal to
health care facilities, some social, cultural or economic, and some
legal-have pushed these facilities to develop ethics committees
and ethics consult services." Until the late 1980s, their creation
was

voluntary

everywhere

in

the

U.S.

7

In

1986,

Maryland

lawmakers mandated for the first time in the U.S. that hospitals
develop an ethics committee or similar body. In 1992, the Joint
Commission, a non-profit accrediting group, amended its
standards for hospital accreditation to mandate the presence of an
ethics committee or another in-hospital group that would respond
to ethical challenges within the hospital. 9 That accreditation

33. AM. SOC'Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMANITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES FOR HEALTH
CARE ETHICS CONSULTATION 19 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter ASBH, CORE COMPETENCIES].

34. Id. at 3 (some critics bemoaned the definition's vagueness); see, e.g., Giles R.
Scofield, What Is MedicalEthics Consultation?, 36J.L., MED. & ETHICS 95, 97 (2008).
35. See Mark P. Aulisio, Why Did Hospital Ethics Committees Emerge in the US?, 18 AMA
J. ETHICS 546, 546 (2016).
36. See id. at 550 (noting relevance of developments in technology, moral issues,
"clashes between values in a pluralistic context, and relative time-pressure for decisionmaking," as factors calling for services of ethics consultants).

37.

See id. at 548-49.

38.

Maryland Patient Care Advisory Committee Act, MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN

§19-371 (LexisNexis 2013); see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees in
Health Care Institutions - Is It Time?, 50 MD. L. REv. 746, 748 (1991); Thaddeus Mason
Pope, Legal Briefing: Healthcare Ethics Committees, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 74, 75 (2011)
[hereinafter Legal Briefing] (other states, including Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, and Texas enacted "ethics committee statutes" by 2010).
39. Legal Briefing, supra note 38, at 76 (citing JOINT COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK § LD.04.02.03

(2011)).
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requirement was significant to all U.S. hospitals.40 By the end of
the twentieth century, virtually every hospital in the U.S. with at
least 400 beds offered ethics consult services, often through ethics
committees.4 1
The ASBH Task Force on core competencies described
"ethics facilitation" as the most appropriate approach for ethics
42
consultants in responding to health care conflicts. This approach
asks ethics consultants to "elucidate issues, aid effective
communication, and integrate the perspectives of the relevant
stakeholders." 43 The task force identified the key attributes of the
ethics facilitation approach as "(1) identifying and analyzing the
nature of the value uncertainty, and (2) facilitating the building of
a principled ethical resolution."'
The ASBH Task Force rejected two alternative approaches
to ethics consultation." An "authoritarian approach" defines the
consultant's moral values as privileged.' This approach precludes
the "process that respects the rightful decision-making authority"
of those affected by the health care conflict (including the
patient)

."

At the opposite end of the continuum, the task force

posited a "pure consensus approach."" This approach aims to
49
This
"forge agreement" regardless of the issues at stake.
justified
ethically
of
importance
approach "fails to incorporate the
50
norms or values."

The task force's description of the preferred approach to
suggests clear
facilitation")
("ethics
consultations
ethics
and of
consultants
ethics
of
aims
differences between the key
courts of law in responding to cases occasioned by health care
conflicts."1 Moreover, significant debate has surrounded questions

40. Id.
41. Aulisio, supra note 35, at 546. In addition to large hospitals, Aulisio reports that
federal hospitals and hospitals that belonged to the Council of Teaching Hospitals also
had ethics committees or consult services. Id.
42.

ASBH, CORE COMPETENCIES, supra note 33, at 6.

43.

Id. at 7.

44.

Id. The work of the Brookside ethics consult service reflects those attributes.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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about the relationship between the work of ethics consultants and
that of courts in such cases:
[A] lmost every possible arrangement of courts and
committees has been suggested. Thus some
commentators have advocated case consultation as a
way of trying to keep cases out of court. Others have
argued that consultation should actually substitute
for judicial review .. .. Given these divergent views,
it is not surprising that American judges have also
failed to be consistent in their approach. Thus in
one case the courts treated a committees'
determinations
as
highly
persuasive
"evidence" . . . [T]he court seemed to use the
committee's documentation for assurance that the
doctor and experts had come up with the right
answer, and that the appropriate procedure would
yield that answer. But in other cases the courts have
virtually ignored a committee's recommendations
or have ordered some kind of future committee
process.
That description suggests a need for more consistency in
shaping the relationship between ethics committees and courts.
More particularly, in cases entertained first by ethics consultants
and then by judges, institutionalizing processes that would
encourage or even require communication between ethics
consultants and judges might lead to more satisfactory results for
stakeholders, including patients, their family members, and
clinicians.53

This would require the capacity to translate the
presumptions held by discrete professional domains into terms
that make sense within other domains, and thus, it would require

52.

Hendrick, supra note 32, at i52 (citations omitted).

53.

See infra Part V (recommending this sort of communication). In a hospital, such

as Brookside, this encourages its legal staff to work with its ethics consult service; such
collaboration can be invaluable to the more far-reaching development of channels of
communication between ethics consultants and courts. Id.
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the softening of lines separating professional silos.54 The scope of
such translation can be discerned by comparing identities
bestowed on patients in the stories told about them by law,
medicine, and bioethics. 5
The stories that courts narrate are grounded in a notion of
representations of some event, situation or act
facts-discrete
legal
in the world to which truth is attributed. 6 Connecting legal facts
produces legal stories.5 ' Those stories, constructed in the context
of explicit rules and procedures, are encompassed within a frame
of reference that speaks about justice or justice-gone-wrong."
Although less single-mindedly than was once the case, medicine,
in contrast, assumes patient identities, and thus, patient stories in
light of diagnoses and within the frame of a professional
hierarchy. 59 Ethics consultants are often clinicians, and ethics
consult services are part of the medical enterprise.' Yet, they
deviate from medicine's approach to patient stories." The stories
told by ethics consultants are far more likely to facilitate patients
or their surrogate decision-makers in reclaiming a position of
responsibility in patients' care." Yet, even as they acknowledge the
patient-as-person, they aim as well to acknowledge the clinician-asperson." Not all ethics consultants' work reflects this
54.

See

Michelle

O'Daniel

&

Alan

H.

Rosenstein,

Chapter 33: Professional

Communication and Team Collaboration, in PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCEBASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES 2-271 (Ronda Hughes ed., 2008).

55.

See infra Parts II and III.

56.

See Facts, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (Online 2nd ed.) https://thelawdictionary.o

rg/fact.
57. See generally Stephen A. Weiner, The CivilJury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 1867 (1966).

58.

See id.

See ARTHUR FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYrELLER 59-68 (2d ed. 2013) (analyzing
patients' stories). The twentieth-century American sociologist Talcott Parsons described
the "sick role" in the 1950s. See TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951). A central
parameter of that role involved the patient's acceptance of the doctor's diagnosis. Id. Even
now, almost three-quarters of a century after Talcott Parsons identified the significance
that a patient's diagnosis plays in his or her submission to the medical domain, medicine
continues to subsume patients' stories within a diagnostic frame. Id.
59.

60. John La Puma & Stephen E. Toulmin, Ethics Consultants and Ethics Committees,
149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1109, 1110 (1989).
61. See id. at 1109.
62. See id. Again, not all ethics consultants follow the model delineated here. On the
whole, those working at Brookside do follow this model. This approach reflects Arthur

Frank's call to help patients reclaim their pre-diagnosis selves. FRANK, supra note 59.
63. See Rita Charon, NarrativeMedicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection, Profession, and
Trust, 286JAMA 1897, 1897 (2001).
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understanding of the ethicist's work, but many do." Part II of this
article has illustrated that vision of ethics consultations through
the work of one large ethics consult service.
III. DISPUTES BETWEEN PREGNANT WOMEN AND CLINICIANS OR
HOSPITALS

The ethics and legal cases considered in this Part involve
health care conflicts between pregnant women and their clinicians
or the hospitals in which they were patients. Section A considers
disputes about cesarean sections, and Section B considers disputes
about blood transfusions. Each section examines matching cases,
reviewed, respectively, by Brookside's ethics consult service and by
a court of law.6
A. Compelled Cesareans

By the 1980s, new imaging techniques gave clinicians
access to fetal development.67 That technology and other new
technological developments in obstetrical care facilitated medical
organizations' and clinicians' "bestow[ing] upon the fetus the
status of a patient."6 ' This led to confusion about the identity of
the obstetrician's patient, and it resulted in more obstetrical
interventions, including cesarean sections.69
Most women consent to a cesarean if it is recommended by
their doctor. 70 But some do not.7n Refusal to consent to a cesarean
may be grounded in religious beliefs, fear of surgery, a

64. See, e.g., id. (Charon's work presents the narrative about relationships between
patients and family members differently than Frank's work.).
65.

See supra notes 26, 28-30 and accompanying text.

66.

Supra note 21. The matching cases reflect similar conflicts

and patient

populations. They are not, however, necessarily connected each to the other, in any other
manner.

67. See Carol B. Benson & Peter M. Doubilet, The History of Imaging in Obstetrics, 273
RADIOLOGY S92, S94, S97-S98 (2014).
68. Nancy K Rhoden, The judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951, 1951-52 (1986).
69.

Id. (noting that imaging allowed revelation of placenta praevia, slow uterine

growth, as well as whether a fetus is likely to be born feet-first. Each of these conditions
may call for a cesarean). Electronic fetal monitoring (available in the 1970s) can reveal

abnormalities in a fetus's heart rate, which may indicate need for a cesarean. Id. at 1957.
70. Id. at 1959.
71. Id.
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commitment to "natural childbirth," or something else." This
section compares the process of decision-making by a hospital
ethics consult service with the process of decision-making by
courts of law in cases involving women who refused cesareans
recommended by their clinicians." Subsection i of this Section
considers a case handled by Brookside's ethics consult service
about a patient who refused a cesarean. Subsection ii considers
two matching cases, decided by judges.
i.

An Ethics Consultation Involving a
Patient's Refusal to Submit to a
Cesarean Section

In 2012, a Brookside obstetrical resident ("Dr. R.") sought
an ethics consult, while caring for a pregnant woman ("CO").7 At
the time, CO was about twenty-five weeks pregnant and was
hospitalized at Brookside." Dr. R. sought the consult because CO
refused to consent to a cesarean section that was recommended by
That
obstetricians."
attending
hospital's
of the
one
recommendation followed CO's diagnosis with gestational
diabetes and hypertension, as well as evidence that the fetus she
carried was in distress." Changes in the fetus's condition during
the thirty-six hours before Dr. R. asked the ethics consult service to
participate in resolving the conflict about CO's care led Dr. R. to
conclude that the fetus's condition was deteriorating and that a
78
cesarean should be performed as soon as possible.

72.
73.

Id.
See Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27. The ethics consult reports reviewed

in this Part were selected from among a total of eight consult reports describing cases
occasioned by healthcare conflicts about treatment for a pregnant woman. Each of the

eight cases arose between the start of 2012 and October 2017. Of the eight cases, some
have not been reviewed here as the reports do not provide easy comparison to legal cases,
because no matching legal cases could be identified, or for some other reason.

74. See id. The report has been de-identified and a few facts about the patient's
diagnosis or care have been altered. Similarly, potentially identifying facts about clinicians
(e.g., gender) have sometimes been altered as well. Finally, all patients and clinicians
referred to in this article are referred to by initials that do not reflect the actual first letters
of the parties' first and last names.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The ethics consult team met and discussed the situation
with CO and with hospital clinicians responsible for CO's care.79
CO was very positive about being pregnant and looked forward to
giving birth with joy." She had not refused the recommended
cesarean on religious grounds or for any other moral reason.8
Rather, as reported by an ethics consultant, she preferred to allow
things to go their way in order to "give the pregnancy more
time."8 2 In effect, her choice reflected her understanding of the
medical facts." CO mentioned that one of her cousins was
similarly situated to CO during the last trimester of her
pregnancy. 4 CO reported that her cousin was placed on bed rest
and delivered at term with no harm to herself or to the infant to
whom she gave birth." She saw her cousin's positive experience as
powerful evidence that she too could avoid a cesarean so early in
her pregnancy and could successfully carry her baby to term or, at
least, could give the fetus more time to develop in utero before its
birth.
CO conducted online research of her own and had
concluded, based on that research, that the risks of delivering a
fetus at twenty-five weeks were greater than the risks of harm to
herself or the fetus should the pregnancy continue. The ethics
consultant, herself a physician, described CO as "very intelligent
and well-reasoned."" An important aspect of this case was the
willingness of the ethics team and in the end, the obstetrician who
had recommended an emergency cesarean, to consider CO's
conclusions and to acknowledge the extent of the medical
uncertainty underlying decisions about CO's obstetrical care.
Dr. R. openly talked with the ethics consultant about her
own growing uncertainty about the best form of care for CO and
her fetus.9 o The concern of CO's clinicians about the risks to CO
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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and about the possible effects of CO's condition on fetal
development did not abate; they continued to recommend a
cesarean." However, the clinicians also acknowledged that the
risks of very early delivery were not definitively less significant than
the risks to the fetus of postponing the cesarean and allowing the
92

pregnancy to progress.
Moreover, CO told the ethics consultant that she would
agree to a cesarean should her clinicians tell her that her own
health was at risk or that the condition of the fetus had
deteriorated such that the risks of postponing delivery clearly
outweighed the risks of a premature delivery.93 The willingness of
CO's clinicians to acknowledge the value of the patient's own
informal research about her condition and to address the medical
uncertainty at the center of CO's case, as well as CO's agreement
to reconsider her decision should the clinicians report a shift in
the medical situation for her or the fetus, frame the success of this
ethics consult.94
An additional component of the ethics consult report
deserves note. In addition to talking with most, if not all, of the
stakeholders involved in CO's care, the ethics consult service
identified relevant medical literature about decision-making in
obstetrical care. 95 The consult team pointed to one article, in
particular, that focused on medical uncertainty (such as the
uncertainty surrounding decisions about the best care for CO)."
The authors of the article recommended attaching significant
weight to the conclusions of the pregnant woman in situations of
medical uncertainty." The identification of medical uncertainty as
a specific and important component of ethical deliberations in
cases resembling CO's helped shape responses from most of the
stakeholders involved in CO's care.98

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.

94.

See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.

95.

Pregnancy Case P20122, supranote 27.
Id. (citing L. B. MCCULLOUGH & F.A. CHERVENAK, ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND

96.

GYNECOLOGY (1994)).
97.
See L. B. MCCULLOUGH
GYNECOLOGY (1994).

98.

&

F.A.

CHERVENAK,

See Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27.
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Thus, the ethics team-noting the uncertainty embedded
in efforts to assess comparative risks facing CO and the fetusconcluded that CO's choice to forgo the recommended cesarean
should be respected.' That recommendation, as is the case with
all such ethics consultants' recommendations at Brookside, was
precatory and unenforceable.oo The ethics team did not want or
expect its recommendation to be coercive.' In short, the ethics
consultant leading the consult team respected the attending
obstetrician's preference for an immediate delivery by cesarean
but concluded that CO's autonomy should outweigh the
physician's medical conclusions, especially since the physician
acknowledged that CO's case involved significant medical
uncertainty.102

The ethics team's own conclusions were not imposed on
the parties.' 0 3 Rather, the clinicians accepted the ethicists'
recommendation and agreed to continue to share information
with CO about her medical condition as it stabilized or changed
over time and information about the condition of the fetus.' 0 4 The
ethics team's report concluded by applauding CO's clinicians for
their "honest transparency" and thoughtful treatment of CO."5
This ethics consult was successful for all of the
stakeholders. It illustrates some of the most compelling benefits of
involving ethics consultants in hospital cases that involve health
care conflicts. A reasonable medical accommodation was
reached.'
The process safeguarded
each stakeholder's
personhood. And the health care conflict that led to the call for
an ethics consult was abated.1 07 Not all ethics consults are as
successful.' 0 8 Some less successful consults are addressed in latter
sections of this article.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part III.B.2.
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Legal Cases Involving Patients Refusing
to Submit to a Recommended Cesarean

This Subsection focuses on two legal cases; each is similar
to CO's case, because each case involved a pregnant woman who
refused to consent to a recommended cesarean.'" In each of these
cases, a judge authorized the cesarean that had been
recommended by the patient's clinicians even though in both
cases the pregnant woman objected to having a cesarean
performed."'o Moreover, in each of these cases, an appellate court
reversed the lower court's decision.' In neither case did the
appellate court's decision preclude the cesarean section to which
the patient had objected because both appellate court decisions
were reached after the cesarean sections had been performed."'
In In re A. C., the pregnant woman died two days after the cesarean
and her baby died within a few hours of its birth."' In Burton v.
State, the fetus, delivered by cesarean, was born dead."'
Neither appellate court decision absolutely precluded
coerced care. The en banc decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals in
A.C.-identified as a woman named Angela Carder-shaped a
jurisprudential frame on which future courts (and ethics
consultants) might rely in responding to cases involving similar
disputes."' Burton, in contrast, did not re-shape existing state law
regarding limitations on a pregnant woman's right to make her
own medical decisions even though the appellate court did not
support the lower court's order."' For that reason, the appellate
court decision in A.C. will be reviewed in more detail in this article
than that in Burton. A tripartite comparison of the work of the
ethics consult service, the decision-making of the lower court
judges, and the opinions of the two appellate courts in A.C. and
Burton, respectively, suggest that appellate court review of
bioethical disputes can offer an important complement to

109.
263, 264
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1237; Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1253; Burton, 49 So. 3d at 266.
In re A. C., 573 A.2d at 1237; Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1241.
Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1241-42.
See Burton, 49 So. 3d at 266.
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decision-making on the ground (whether in courts or by hospital
ethics consult services)."'
iii.

In re A.C.

Carder's"" story has been told by courts and by
commentators."'9 Unfortunately, there seems to be no public
record of the trial court proceedings in the case. Thus, the
account here of that court's decision-making reflects information
court 2 0 and secondary

sources.' 2

'

provided by the appellate

Carder's story-an emotional and sad story-seeks a "thick"
description.' 2 2 Judges

focus

on

legal

facts,1 23

and

in

cases

occasioned by health care conflicts, that can be a significant factor
in limiting trial courts' attention to stakeholders' underlying
concerns and relationships.1 24 Generally, that precludes them
from offering nuanced narratives.
Court accounts of Carder's story offer only a thin
narrative.' 25 Accounts of Carder's story presented in scholarly and
popular articles and through public media enhance one's
understanding of the stakeholders, their preferences, and their
values.' 2 6 In short, such extra-judicial sources facilitate a clearer

117. See infra Part ll.A (noting limitations of trial court decisions in these cases but
benefits of some appellate court decisions). The Burton court relied significantly on
earlier state court decisions regarding the rights of pregnant women to make medical
decisions. See Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265-66; see also id. at 267-68 (Berger, J., dissenting)
(noting that Burton was not a "case of first impression").
118. InreA.C.,573A.2d 1235.
119.

See, e.g., William

J.

Curran, Court-ordered Cesarean Sections Receive Judicial Defeat,

323 N.E.J.M. 489, 490-91 (1990). See generally Tracey E. Spruce, The Sound of Silence:
Women's Voices in Medicine and Law, 7 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 239, 239 (1998) (discussing
the story of Angie Carder); In reA.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987); In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235.
120. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1235.
121. See, e.g., Curran, supra note 119, at 489-90; Spruce, supra note 119, at 239.
122.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ,

THE INTERPRETATION

OF CULTURES

6-7,

9-10

(1973)

(defining a "thick description" as one which gives the person the intellectual meaning
behind a certain gesture, action, etc.).
123.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 56 (considering meaning of "legal

facts").
124. See David Rcmnick, Whose Life Is It Anyway? Angie Carder Lived a Very Simple
Life. . . And Died a Very Complicated Death, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1988, atW12-13.
125. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1263-64; Remnick, supra note 124, at W12.
126. See Spruce, supra note 119, at 239. See generally Curran, supra note 119; Remnick,
supra note 124.
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understanding of Carder's voice (largely absent from the courts'
decisions).12

a young adolescent, Carder was diagnosed with
surgery and chemotherapy, her condition went
After
cancer.
2
into remission.' 1 When Carder was in her early twenties, the
1 30
cancer recurred--diagnosed at that time as osteogenic sarcoma.
Treatment included amputation of her left leg and part of her
pelvis.13 ' Carder later married and soon thereafter became
pregnant.1 3 2 During the twenty-fifth week of the pregnancy,
33
Carder's physicians diagnosed her with terminal cancer.' Carder
opted to receive palliative treatment, and hoped, along with her
clinicians, that she would live until the twenty-eighth week of the
pregnancy.1 3 4 Carder's clinicians expected that by that time, the
5
fetus's prognosis would have improved significantly.` However,
soon after Carder was diagnosed, her condition deteriorated
dramatically.13 1 Intubation soon became necessary to ease Carder's
As

1 28

breathing.13

7

George Washington University Hospital sought a court
order to decide "what [the hospital] should do in terms of the
fetus, whether to intervene [by Caesarean section] and save its
life."' 38 When Carder's case was brought to court, there had been
significant pressure to reach a decision quickly in light of Carder's
worsening condition.1 3' The legal proceedings during the last days
40
Judge Emmet Sullivan,
of Carder's life were expeditious.o
convened a trial court hearing in the hospital."' Carder, who was
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See, e.g., Spruce, supranote 119.
In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987).
Id.
See Spruce, supra note 119, at 239.
Id.
In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 612.
Id.
In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).

135.

Id.

136.

Id. at 1239.

137.

Id.

138. In re A. C., 533 A.2d at 612.
139. See id. at 613 ("In retrospect, we must acknowledge that any attempt to use rules
on stay procedures places appellate form over substances. No appeal in this case could
mature.").
Id. (describing the hastily-put-together nature of the appellate proceeding).
140.
141. The trial court proceedings are not available, but that court's decision is
reviewed by the appellate court See In re AC., 573 A.2d at 1238.
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intubated at the time, was not present.
After the hospital
hearing, Judge Sullivan authorized the hospital to proceed with "a
Cesarean section on [this] terminally ill woman who was in
extremis." 4

At that time, some of Carder's clinicians believed that she
was capable of making medical decisions and that she had made it
clear, even though intubated, that she did not want the cesarean
performed.'" Carder's parents agreed that their daughter did not
want a cesarean.14 After Carder's death, her mother, Nettie
Stoner, expressed deep regret about her daughter's having been
subjected to a compelled cesarean: "I thought we had the right to
choose what we were going to do with our bodies ... Angela
should have had the choice. And Angela did not have the
choice." 14

Before the cesarean was performed, Carder's counsel
requested that the appellate court stay the lower court's order.,4 7
Judge Nebeker of the D.C. Court of Appeals declined to issue the
requested stay.148 Later, the same court, hearing the case en banc,
vacated Judge Nebeker's refusal to stay the trial court order 49 and
established a new frame for considering medical decision-making
for and by pregnant women.1o By that time, Carder and her baby,
who lived for about two hours,'' had both died.'"' Carder's death
certificate noted the cesarean to have been a "contributing cause"
of her death.'
In 1990, after Carder and the fetus died, the D.C. Court of
Appeals suggested a framework for responding to cases such as

142. Id. at 1240 (noting that the clinicians "discouraged" the judge from moving the
hearing). The judge did not question one of the hospital clinicians who opined that the
proceedings should not be moved to Angela's bedside. Id.
143. InreA.C.,533A.2dat611.
144. Cynthia Corney, Whose Body Is It, Anyway?: The Legal Maelstrom That Rages When
the Rights of Mother and Fetus Collide, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1988, at D1.
145. Id.
146. Id. at D3.
147. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 611.
148. Id. at 611-12.Judge Nebeker wrote for the panel. Id. at 611.
149. Id. at 611.
150. See generally In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
151. Id. at 1241.
152. Id. at 1238.
153. See Curran, supra note 119, at 490.
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that posed by Carder's situation.'1 4 The appellate court introduced
its opinion with a brief statement about the court proceedings that
occurred while Carder was alive and pregnant.15 5 The summary is
stark.' 5 6 It contrasts tellingly with the engaged report of the
5
hospital ethics consult service regarding CO.'1 Judge Terry, for
the court en banc wrote in Carder's case:
This case comes before the court for the second
time. [The first time], a threejudge division denied
a motion to stay an order of the trial court which
had authorized a hospital to perform a caesarean
section on a dying woman in an effort to save the
life of her unborn child. The operation was
performed, but both the mother and the child died.
A few months later, the court ordered the case
heard en banc and vacated the opinion of the
motions division. Although the motions division
recognized that, as a practical matter, it "decided
the entire matter when [it] denied the stay," the en
banc court has nevertheless heard the full case on
the merits. 5 8

The fateful significance, 5 9 for Carder and her fetus, of the
lower court proceedings has been elided by the attention given to
6
the jurisprudential approach constructed by the appellate court. o
The appellate court rendered that decision two years after Carder
and her baby's deaths.' 1 The jurisprudential significance of the
court's en banc decision does not gainsay the unfortunate
consequences of the earlier court proceedings for Carder and the
baby in the last days of Carder's life. The legal proceedings in this
case, however one assesses the significance of the appellate court's

154.
155.
156.
157.

In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237.
Id. at 1238.
See id.
See Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27.

158.

In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237 (citations omitted).

159. Even if Carder and the fetus would not have died, the trial court's decision
shaped the last days of Carder's life. Carder, herself, might well have preferred a different
end-of-life experience, both for herself and for her fetus.
160. SeelnreA.C.,573A.2dat 1235.
161. See id.
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decision after the patient's death, did not serve Carder. 6 2 To some
extent, the appellate court echoed that conclusion in vacating
Judge Nebeker's refusal to stay the trial court's order.1 6 1
Judge Terry explained that Judge Nebeker, unsure about
Carder's views regarding a cesarean, did not attempt to discern
what Carder would have preferred.' The appellate court,
reviewing the case en banc, thus accepted Judge Nebeker's
conclusion that Carder's views were essentially unknowable when
it authorized the hospital to perform a cesarean:165
What a trial court must do in a case such as this is to
determine, if possible, whether the patient is
capable of making an informed decision about the
course of her medical treatment. If she is, and if she
makes such a decision, her wishes will control in
virtually all cases. If the court finds that the patient
is incapable of making an informed consent (and
thus incompetent), then the court must make a
substituted judgment. This means that the court
must ascertain as best it can what the patient would
do if faced with the particular treatment question.
Again, in virtually all cases, the decision of the
patient, albeit discerned through the mechanism of
substituted judgment, will control.' 66
Thus in vacating Judge Nebeker's decision, the D.C. Court
of Appeals concluded that Carder had the right to make medical
decisions for herself."' The court accepted the conclusion that
Carder's own views were unknowable, but it held that the trial
court should have followed a substituted judgement procedure.16 8
That would have obliged the court to discern what Carder would
have wanted, while she continued to enjoy capacity.1 69 In effect, in
the view of the D.C. Court of Appeals, pregnant women were not
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See id.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1252.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
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to be treated differently than other patients-at least in the great
majority of situations-and therefore, they were entitled to
decision-making autonomy regarding medical care.o In the case
of a pregnant woman without capacity, her preferences while still
capable should serve as a substitute for the exercise of
contemporaneous autonomy."' The court explained:
It would be an extraordinary case indeed in which a
court might ever be justified in overriding the
patient's wishes and authorizing a major surgical
procedure such as a caesarean section ... [W] e
have stressed that the patient's wishes, once they are
ascertained, must be followed in "virtually all
cases . .. unless there are truly extraordinary or
compelling reasons to override them" . . . Indeed,

some may doubt that there could ever be a situation
extraordinary or compelling enough to justify a
massive intrusion into a person's body, such as a
caesarean section, against that person's will."'
The appellate court's opinion in this case, which
contrasted with earlier cases involving pregnant women refusing
cesarean sections,17 3 shaped subsequent approaches-both in
courts and in hospitals-to competent pregnant women refusing
recommended care. 174 In short, the court proceedings were of
75
potential value to others, but none to Carder or her fetus.' The
significance of the A. C. ruling is suggested by a statistical noted in
an article published in the same year as the en banc appellate
court decision in A.C.: in cases brought by clinicians or hospitals
involving pregnant women refusing recommended cesareans,

170. Id. at 1242-47.
171. Id. at 1237, 1249.
172. Id. at 1252.
173. See Curran, supra note 119, at 489-90 (describing the en banc appellate court
decision in A.C. to have broken with a "trend").
174. See Spruce, supra note 119, at 245.
175. See id. at 241; see, e.g., D.R. by A.F. v. Daughters of Miriam Ctr. for the Aged, 589
A.2d 668 (N.J. Super. CL. Ch. Div. 1990) (relying on In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, to rule that
when available, a court must consider prior wishes of an incompetent patient from any

time that they were competent to make medical decisions).
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judges ordered that a cesarean be performed against the pregnant
woman's wishes in eighty-six percent of the cases.' 7 6
Carder's case was and remains haunting for many
reasons.' 7 7 Among those reasons is the failure of the courts to give
Carder an opportunity to tell her story as she would have wanted it
told.7 s Tracey Spruce, offering a thicker version of Carder's story
than did any of the courts, intoned:
This story is not the same one you are likely to hear
from the judges, the doctors, or the lawyers involved
in the Angela Carder case. It might be close to the
one Nettie Stoner [Angela's mother] tells, but it
probably is not the one Rick Carder [Angela's
husband] would tell. Dan Stoner, Angie's father,
would simply tell you a story about how a judge
killed his daughter. The two opinions issued by the
D.C. Court of Appeals tell a story that tries to avoid
criticizing the trial judge's conduct in the hospital
hearing.' 7 9

In any event, the appellate court accepted the trial court's
findings of fact18 and thus failed to listen for Carder's voice,
something a hospital ethics consultant might have done.'8 ' Spruce,
noting the plethora of transformations of Carder's story, suggested

176. Curran, supra note 119, at 489 (citing Veronica E. B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered
ObstetricalInterventions, 316 N.E.J.M. 1192 (1987)). Curran further reports distressing bias
in that "in 81 percent of the cases of court-ordered cesarean sections, the women were

black, Hispanic, or Asian. Twenty-five percent did not speak English as their primary
language." Id. at 489.
177.

For other examples of haunting cases, see COMPLEX ETHICS CONSULTATIONS:

CASES THAT HAUNT US (Paul J. Ford & Denise M. Dudzinski eds., 2008). A forward to this
book, authored by Albert R. Jonsen, described it as "a summons to realism in clinical
ethics." Id. at xv. The cases described in the book, he further notes, are "hard cases," that
can lead to "emotional discomfort" and "intellectual puzzlement." Id. at xix.

178. See Spruce, supra note 119, at 241.
179. Id.
180. Judge Terry explained: "We reiterate that we cannot find the facts in this or any
other case. That is the function of trial judges, who can view the witnesses and discern
from their demeanor and testimony, rather than a cold written record, what the facts are."

In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1251 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
181.

note 33).

See Scofield, supra note 34, at 97 (quoting ASBH, CORE COMPETENCIES, supra
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that there might have been fewer transformations had Carder
been heard-had she ever gotten "to tell her side of it."
iv.

82

Burton v. State

Burton v. State,' 3 a Florida case occasioned by a woman's
refusal to submit to prenatal care, including a cesarean section
recommended by physicians, is less significant than A.C. as a
jurisprudential matter. Unlike A.C., Burton did not establish a legal
framework to which future courts and hospitals might look in
84
responding to disputes between pregnant women and clinicians.
The decision did, however, reverse a trial court order that failed to
1 85
take the patient's needs and preferences into account.
a.

Trial Court Order

Samantha Burton, the mother of two children, was twentyfive weeks pregnant when she voluntarily sought care at
clinicians
Hospital
Hospital.18 6
Memorial
Tallahassee
medical
for
hospital
the
in
stay
Burton
Ms.
that
recommended
8
supervision.' She preferred to go home. 1 The hospital asked the
state to prohibit Burton from leaving the hospital, arguing that
continued hospitalization was necessary to safeguard the fetus's
life.'"' Florida's Attorney General appointed the hospital's outside
9
counsell 90 to serve as a "special assistant state attorney."' ' In
response to a petition from that "state attorney," a state circuit
court judge spoke with Burton on the telephone and with a
hospital physician and then ordered that Burton remain in the
hospital subject to the care of hospital clinicians who were:

182.
183.
184.
185.

Spruce, supra note 119, at 241.
Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
CompareIn re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252, with Burton, 49 So. 3d 263.
See Burton, 49 So. 3d 263.

186.

Kate Wevers, Burton v. Florida: Maternal-Fetal Conflicts and Medical Decision-

Making DuringPregnancy, 38J.L. MED. & ETHICS 436,436 (2010).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
Lacey Stutz, Myth of Protection: Florida Courts Permitting Involuntary Medical
Treatment ofPregnant Women, 67 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1039 (2013).
190.

191.

Wevers, supra note 186, at 436.
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authorized to provide such medical care and

treatment to Samantha Burton and her unborn
child as in their reasonable professional judgment is
necessary to preserve the life and health of
Samantha Burton's unborn child, including but not
limited to restricting Samantha Burton to bed rest,
administering appropriate medication, postponing
labor, taking appropriate steps to prevent and/or
treat infection and/or eventually performing a
cesarean section delivery of the child at the
appropriate time. Samantha Burton is ordered to
comply with the attending physician's orders with
regard to such medical care and treatment. 92
Not only was Burton compelled to submit to medical care
that she did not want, but she was effectively imprisoned in a
hospital for the duration of her pregnancy.' 3 A cesarean was
performed two days after the court issued its order.'94 The fetus
had already died.'
The trial court order-unusual in cases such as this one in
being available to the public'`-illustrates the limitations of
judicial responses to bioethical disputes about patient care,
especially in cases in which the patient and/or family members of
the patient are opposed by clinicians and the hospital.'97 Leon
County Circuit Court Judge John Cooper, referring to Burton's
fetus as "the unborn child," relied on the testimony of what he
described as "the unborn child's attending physician."' 9 8 Asserting
that "as between parent and child, the ultimate welfare of the

192. In re Unborn Child of Samantha Burton, No. 2009 CA 116, 2009 WL 8628562
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2009).
193. See Howard Minkoff & Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Samantha Burton and the Rights of
Pregnant Women Twenty Years After In re A.C., 40(6) HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13 (2010).

194.
195.

Id.
Id.

196. See Lynn M. Paltrow &Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implicationsfor Women's Legal Status and PublicHealth,

38

J.

HEALTH POL., PoL.'Y & L.

299, 304

(2013)

(noting factors

that precluded

identification of cases involving pregnant women subject to arrest, detention and/or
treatment interventions, all related to matters connected with pregnancy).

197.
198.

In re Unborn Child of Samantha Burton, 2009 WL 8628562.
Id.
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child is the controlling factor,"19 and that Burton "exhibited
behavior since her admission to [the hospital] in contradiction to
the health care providers' instructions and recommendations, "200
Judge Cooper authorized the hospital and its clinicians to provide
any care to Burton that they deemed appropriate and denied
Burton's request to move to a different hospital for the sake of the
"child's best interest." 2 0 ' Even more, he authorized the hospital to
notify the state's Department of Children and Families about
"Samantha Burton's condition." 202
In short, the trial court judge defined Burton as a noncompliant patient who "exhibited behavior" that contravened the
clinicians' recommendations, including continuing to smoke
during her pregnancy.'2 3 Her interests and preferences were
ignored or displaced for the presumptive sake of the fetus she
carried.20 Burton was deprived of virtually all choice in deciding
about her own care, including the right to find a hospital willing
to provide care that met with her preferences for continuing her
pregnancy and for giving birth.20 ' The trial court's order did not
serve Burton, and although Judge Cooper could not have foreseen
the fetus's death that occurred two days after he issued the court's
order that order did not serve the fetus either.2 06
b.

Appellate court decision in Burton

As in A. C., 20 7 the appellate court in Burton agreed to grant
an appeal concluding that the issues at stake were "capable of
repetition" and might "evade review" in a subsequent case due to
20
the rapidity with which medical events can unfold in such cases. s
As a general matter, the appellate court, relying on state
precedent, agreed that the right of a pregnant woman to make her
own medical decisions can-in contrast with the rights of almost
every other competent adult-be outweighed by the state's
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Minkoff & Lyerly, supra note 193, at 13.
In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
Burton v. Florida, 49 So. 3d 263, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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interest in safeguarding the life of a viable fetus."o' However, the
court reversed the trial court's order on two grounds.2 1 0 First, the
viability of the twenty-five week fetus had not been established:
Because there is no statutory or precedential
presumption of viability, in terms of the stage of
pregnancy or otherwise, there must be some
evidence of viability via testimony or otherwise. Only
after the threshold determination of viability has
been made may the court weigh the state's
compelling interest to preserve the life of the fetus
against the patient's fundamental constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment.2 1 1
Second, the state must "establish a compelling state
interest" in order to "override the pregnant woman's
constitutional right to the control of her person."2 12 The court
explained that "where the state does establish a compelling state
interest ... the state must then show that the method for pursuing
that compelling state interest is 'narrowly tailored in the least
intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the
individual. "'213
v.

Comparison of CO's case with those of
Angela Carder and Samantha Burton

Judge Terry, who wrote the opinion for the en banc
appellate court in A. C., expressed discomfort at trial court judges
hearing cases, such as Carder's. 2 1 1 "We observe . .. that it would be
far better if judges were not called to patients' bedsides and
required to make quick decisions on issues of life and death."21 5
Judge Terry suggested instead that an alternative "tribunal" be

209.
210.

Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266.

211. Id. But see id. at 268 n.2 (Berger, J., dissenting) (opining that "we must presume
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's decision, e.g., that viability was

determined").
212. Id. at 266 (majority opinion).
213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2. (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
215. Id.
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created that would entertain cases such as that involving Angela
Carder, "with limited opportunity for judicial review."216
A comparison of court responses in A. C. and Burton with
those of the Brookside ethics consult service in CO's case supports
Judge Terry's concern about the limitations of judges responding
to health care conflicts, such as those that faced CO, Carder, and
Burton. The ethics consultants were able to attend to the patient's
voice and to encourage the patient's clinicians to respond with the
patient's voice in mind.2 1 1 Communication with the patient and
1
Moreover, the
her clinicians facilitated important dialogue.
ethics consultants understood the significance of the medical
2 19
In contrast, the trial
uncertainty at the center of CO's care.
judges in both A.C. and Burton elided the medical uncertainty at
2 20
the center of both Carder's and Burton's cases.
a.

The Pregnant Woman Voice, Personhood, and
Conversation

The trial court judge never entered the hospital room
where Carder was being cared for.2 2 ' Although she was intubated,
222
she was alert and able to respond to questions competently.
Carder's voice was rendered mute by the appellate court because
216. Id. While firmly deeming the "trial court's findings of fact" as "binding" on the
appellate court, judge Terry noted the limitations placed on the trial court, obliged to
hear the case expeditiously given Carder's rapidly declining health. Id. at 1248.
[A] nyjudicial proceeding in a case such as this will ordinarily take placelike the one before us here-under time constraints so pressing that it is
difficult or impossible for the mother to communicate adequately with
counsel, or for counsel to organize an effective factual and legal
presentation in defense of her liberty and privacy interests and bodily

integrity. Any intrusion implicating such basic values ought not to be
lightly undertaken when the mother not only is precluded from
conducting pre-trial discovery (to which she would be entitled as a matter
of course in any controversy over even a modest amount of money) but
also is in no position to prepare meaningfully for trial.

Id.
217.

See supra Part II.A.1 (describing CO's experience) and Part II.A.2 (describing

Carder's and Burton's experiences).

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27.
See id.
See supra Part II.A.2 (describing Carder's and Burton's experiences).
In re A. C., 573 A.2d at 1238.
Id. at 1241.
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all of the courts that entertained her situation were unable to
"hear" her.22 1 One of Carder's treating physicians explained to the
superior courtjudge:
[Angela] does not make sound because of the tube
in her windpipe. She nods and she mouths words.
One can see what she's saying rather readily. She
asked whether she would survive the operation. She
asked [Dr.] Hammer if he would perform the
operation. He told her he would only perform it if
she authorized it but it would be done in any case.
She understood that. She then seemed to pause for
a few moments and then very clearly mouthed
words several times, I don't want it done. I don't want
it done. Quite clear to me.224
Yet the appellate court concluded that Carder's voice could
not be discerned.2 2' That, according to one commentator, was
"the easy way out."2 2 The commentator added: "If [the judges]
had really listened, they would have heard a dying woman begging
to be allowed to die with her baby." 2 27 Carder's voice disappeared
in a medley of other voices that shaped the courts' assumption
that Carder was not capable of expressing her dying wish to avoid
a cesarean.2 28 Perhaps, as Tracey Spruce suggested, the court's
inability to hear Carder's voice allowed them to preserve a vision
of Carder as a "good mother.""2 In the myth of the good mother,
self-sacrifice for one's child (or one's fetus) is essential.so Had
Carder been understood to reject a cesarean because of the
possibility that it would shorten her life (as seems to have been the

223.

Id. Judge Terry noted that "[c]ounsel

for A.C.

now maintain

that A.C. was

competent and that she made an informed choice not to have the caesarean performed."
Id. at 1238. He then concluded that "the evidence, realistically viewed, does not support
[that]." Id. Further, the court noted its role to preclude "findings of fact ... unless clearly
erroneous." Id. at 1242.
224. Id. at 1241.
225. Id.
226. Spruce, supra note 119, at 241.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 255.
229. Id. at 256.
230. Id. at 253.
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case),"3 it might have been more difficult to portray her as a good
mother.2 32
Thus, from one perspective, the Carder case reflects a
progressive appellate court, vacating a trial court order that
compelled a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean.2 3 3 The case
was applauded by feminists. 234 But from a second perspective, the
appellate court's decision resembled the trial court's decision in
that it failed to heed or hear the pregnant woman's voice.2 35
Burton's story, like that of Carder, is sad. 6 When Burton
was twenty-five weeks pregnant she was effectively confined to a
hospital where she did not want to be.23 ' According to one author,
who focused on components of Burton's story that the courts
ignored, "[Burton] remained alone in a dreary hospital room
until the fetus died and was surgically removed."2 3 ' Burton's
239
situation was likened to "solitary confinement" in a prison.
Unlike Carder, Burton survived.o
After the death of Burton's fetus and the compelled
cesarean, the American Civil Liberties Union brought an
appeal.2 4 ' Michele Goodwin suggests that the success of Burton's
appeal was "symbolic."2 42 Burton had already been subjected to
"three days of involuntary confinement and a forced cesarean
section.""1 In Burton's and Carder's cases, the voice of the patient
was muted and elided. 244 The Florida trial court's treatment of
231. See Curran, supra note 119, at 489-90 (reporting that Carder's death certificate
noted that cesarean as a "contributing cause" of her death).

232.
233.
234.

Spruce, supra note 119, at 246-47.
In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
See, e.g., Spruce, supra note 119, at 245; Rebekah R. Arch, Comment, The

Maternal-FetalRights Dilemma: Honoring a Woman's Choice of Medical Care DuringPregnancy,

12

J.

CONTEMP.

HEALTH L. & PoL'y 537 (1996); Jennifer Beulah Lew, Comment,

Terminally Ill and Pregnant: State Denial of a Woman's Rights to Refuse a Cesarean Section, 38

BUFF. L. REv. 629 (1990).
235. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243 (noting appellate court's obligation to accept
lower court's findings of "fact" "unless clearly erroneous").
236.

See supra Part ll.A.2 (describing Carder's and Burton's experiences).

237.

Id.

238.

Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional

Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 781, 799 (2014).
239. Id. at 800.
240. Id. (stating that the fetus died, but not indicating that the mother had as well).
241. Id. at 805.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See supra Part ll.A.2 (describing Carder's and Burton's experiences).

RESOLVING HEALTH CARE CONFLICTS

2019]

525

Burton openly disdained this woman's voice and her
personhood.2 4 5
While Carder was portrayed as a "good mother," Burton
was portrayed as a "bad mother." 2 ' The trial court judge
characterized Burton as a difficult patient, "exhibit[ing] behavior"
that conflicted with the recommendations of hospital clinicians 2 4 7
and concluded that the state's interest in Burton's fetus displaced
Burton's "privacy interests."" Further, the trial court authorized
the hospital where Burton was confined to notify the state's
Department of Children and Families "of Samantha Burton's
condition so that the Department or other appropriate agency
may monitor and provide any necessary assistance to Samantha
Burton and her children." 2 49 This order assumed Burton was a
neglectful or abusive mother.25 0

Despite distinct and often contrasting portraits painted in
Carder's and Burton's respective court proceedings, both women
were deprived of their personhood. 5 ' Although the Burton
appellate court reversed the trial court's order, its decision offered
no commentary on the trial court's portrait of Burton.5 For
Carder and Burton the trial court decisions were reversed, but the
consequences could not be.2 " Both women's preferences and
needs were largely disregarded in the stories the courts told about
them.2 54
In contrast, CO's case report placed the patient's voice and
personhood at the center of the consultation and strived to
encourage and sustain communication between the patient and
her clinicians." The ethics consult service report reflected the
245.
246.

Goodwin, supra note 238, at 801.
Goodwin noted that that the court ordered the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital to

notify the Department of Children and Families to "intervene as necessary in the

monitoring of Samantha Burton's children." Id. at 802; see also supra note 239 and
accompanying text.

247. In re Unborn Child of Samantha Burton, No. 2009 CA 1167, 2009 WL 8628562
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2009).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. FLA. STAT. § 39.201(2)(a) (2018)
(requiring reports of child abuse,
abandonment, or neglect).

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See supra Part II.A.2 (describing Carder's and Burton's experiences).
Burton v. Florida, 49 So. 3d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 2010).
See supra Part II.A.2 (describing Carder's and Burton's experiences).
See id.
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing CO's experience).
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25
concerns of both CO and her treating clinicians. ' Further, the
report identified the chief bioethical principles at stake to include
respect for the patient's autonomy and concern that the
physicians' professional responsibility (grounded in obligations of
beneficence and non-maleficence for the patient) be respected as
well. 2 5' The consultant's involvement with most of the stakeholders
allowed her to mediate between the obstetrician's wish to perform
a cesarean as soon as possible and the patient's wish to prolong
the pregnancy as long as possible in the hope that the fetus would
be allowed to develop while not suffering increased harm while in
utero.
At the heart of this successful mediation sat the ethics
consultant's focus on the medical uncertainty that surrounded
stakeholders' conflicting conclusions about a course of action that
would best serve CO and her fetus. 59 Uncertainty about the best
treatment options was also at issue in the cases of Carder and
Burton. 26 0 However, the fact of medical uncertainty was handled
1
quite differently in those cases. 2 6 In CO's case, medical
uncertainty was rendered explicit and became the fulcrum around
62
which discourse and eventually agreement were developed.

256.

See id.

257. Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27. All three notions-that of autonomy,
beneficence, and non-maleficence-were proposed in the Belmont Report as guidelines
for conducting human subject research. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH

(1979),

https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-bel

montreport/index.html. The principles, delineated initially to guide human subject
research, have been incorporated into clinical practice. Thomas R. McCormick, Principles

of Bioethics, UNIV. WASH. SCH. MED., https://deps.washington.edu/bioethx/tools/princp
1.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2013).
258. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing CO's experience).
259. See id.
260. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1239 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); In re Unborn Child of
Samantha Burton, No. 2009 CA 1167, 2009 WL 8628562, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27,
2009).
261. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252; In re Unborn Child of Samantha Burton, 2009 WL
8628562 at *2.
262. Pregnancy Case P20122, supranote 27.
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Uncertainty at the Center

CO's obstetrician concluded that an expeditious cesarean
would best serve CO and her fetus." CO disagreed.' She felt that
she could continue the pregnancy safely, giving the fetus more
time to develop before its birth.26 5 Yet, in communicating with the

ethics consultant, both CO and the clinicians acknowledged
uncertainty about the outcome for CO and for the fetus regardless
of the course followed. 2 66 The uncertainty was not masked or
elided.16 7 The ethics consultants picked up on the parties'
readiness to recognize the uncertainty surrounding medical
choices in CO's care in order to define an area of agreement
between CO and her clinicians..2 " Forging that area of agreement
included participation of the obstetrician who favored an
immediate cesarean but who later concurred with CO that that
option was not risk-free and that her care had to be shaped in
light of the medical uncertainty at its center.2 69
In sharp contrast, the uncertainty that attended medical
conclusions in Carder's and Burton's cases was ignored or
displaced. 2 70 In part, that process would seem to reflect the trial
court judges' goal of reaching a clear-cut decision about whether
or not to authorize a cesarean despite the refusal of the pregnant
women to undergo that surgery. 27 ' Had the trial court judge
focused on the probability that the surgery would serve neither
mother nor fetus, he might well have "heard" Carder's voice and
refrained from authorizing surgery. Instead, it would seem, he
opted to try to save the fetus even if Carder could not be saved.27 2
However, the hope that the fetus would be saved may have
displaced a more clear-sighted understanding of the odds facing

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
263 (Fla.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d
Dist. CL. App. 2010).
See In reA.C, 573 A.2d 1235; Burton, 49 So. 3d 263.
In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1240.
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the twenty-six week fetus in the 1980s, a fetus already
273
compromised by Carder's failing medical condition.
Uncertainty also colored medical decision-making for
Burton and her fetus.17' And that was also largely disregarded by
The trial court authorized a cesarean,
the trial court.27'
presumptively to serve the fetus. 7' Two days later, that surgery was
78
performed. 7 7 The fetus was born dead. Yet, the responses of the

Florida court differed from those of the D.C. court in that the
circuit court judge in Burton concluded that Burton's fetus was a
"child" and that the welfare of that child superseded Burton's
health and welfare.2 79 That conclusion further limited the court's
capacity to focus on the uncertainty of the medical situation for
Burton and her fetus.

280

In fact, the decision to perform a significantly pre-term
cesarean often involves medical uncertainty about potential
benefits to a woman and/or her fetus."' Such medical uncertainty
22 The circuit court did
can shape the decision-making process.
28 3
Its only concession to medical
not acknowledge that reality.

uncertainty was a request to the hospital lawyer (delegated to serve
as a special assistant state attorney) to describe "any change in the
circumstances surrounding [Burton's] pregnancy," after the court
issued its order. 28 4 That never happened: Burton's fetus died and
was "delivered by Cesarean." "Two days after entry of the [circuit
28 5
court's] order."

Medical clinicians often make treatment decisions despite
28 7 Yet, it has
uncertainty."' That challenge is central to medicine.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See id. at 1239.
See Burton, 49 So. 3d at 263.
See id.
Id. at 264.

277.

Id.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 263.
See Corney, supra note 144.
See id.
See generally Burton, 49 So. 3d 263.
Order Authorizing Medical Treatment, 2009 WL 8628562 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009).
Burton, 49 So. 3d at 264.
AF West & RR West, Clinical Decision-Making: Coping with Uncertainty, 78

POSTGRADUATE MED.J. 319 (2002).
287. Ming Tai-Seale et al., Expressing Uncertainty in Clinic Interactions Between Physicians
and Older Patients: What Matters?, 86 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 322 (2012).
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been suggested that "doctors tend to dwell on the upside."' If so,
that may reflect an attempt to minimize the discomforts of
uncertainty. 89 Had the courts and the clinicians involved in
Carder's legal and medical cases known that the compelled
cesarean would result in a dead baby, perhaps they would have
allowed Carder to die in peace, without surgery, and without the
knowledge that her baby had died a few hours after its birth. That
was not knowable. But greater readiness to acknowledge and
respond to the medical uncertainty at the center of care decisions
for Carder would likely have re-shaped the trial court's
understanding of the case. Similarly, had the courts and clinicians
responding to Burton known that the fetus would die in utero two
days after the court authorized a cesarean, despite Burton's refusal
to consent, perhaps the cesarean that delivered the dead fetus
might not have been forced on Burton. In CO's case, there were
similar uncertainties. 290 However, they were acknowledged and
discussed openly. 291' That acknowledgment shaped decisions. 29 2 CO
herself, as well as attentive clinicians, including CO's obstetricians
and the ethics consult team, recognized those uncertainties and
discussed them-an important step in their interactions with
CO. 2 93 The recognition of the uncertainty that undergirded
decision-making about CO's care became the modus vivendi, as it
were, for agreement among the stakeholders. 29 4 Recognizing that
uncertainty expressly, the clinicians agreed that CO's preference
to preclude or at least postpone a cesarean deserved respect.29 5

288. Dhruv Khullar, We're Bad at Evaluating Risk: How Doctors Can Help, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/upshot/were-bad-at-evaluatingrisk-how-doctors-can-help.html.
289. Id. (noting two sorts of uncertainty in medicine-the "uncertainty of evidence"
and the "uncertainty of outcome"; the first, Khullar suggests, "is an information
problem," while the second "is a prediction problem").
290. Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27.
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Id.
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B. Pregnant Women Refusing to Submit to Blood
Transfusions
The cases considered in this Section resemble those
considered in Section A of this Part in that they involve the
responses of hospitals, clinicians, bioethicists, and courts to
pregnant women refusing care recommended by their clinicians.
However, the decisions at issue in this section differ from the type
of decision at issue in Section A. Each of the cases considered here
involves women who refused a blood transfusion for herself, her
fetus, or herjust-born infant on religious grounds.
Specifically, each of the cases involves a pregnant Jehovah's
Witness. Jehovah's Witnesses accept medical and surgical care,2 96
but are prohibited from accepting blood transfusions. 2 97 For a
Jehovah's Witness, doing so violates biblical law and results in
excommunication and "eternal damnation."29 ' Thus, the
consequences for a Jehovah's Witness who consents to a blood
transfusion are very serious.29 9
A competent Jehovah's Witness has the right-as do all
competent adults-to consent to or refuse recommended care
even if refusing that care is likely to have dire consequences,
including death.soo Although standards for assessing whether a
patient has been provided with adequate information differ from
state to state,3 0 ' all standards allow competent adult patients to
30 2
refuse recommended care.

Gina Gribow, Forced ObstetricalIntervention: The Role of Religion and Culture and the
296.
Woman's Autonomous Choice, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 182 (2013).

297.

Id.

298.

Chavi Eve Karkowsky, How I Treat Patients Who Refuse Blood Transfusions, SLATE

(June 25, 2013), https://slate.com/technology/2013/06/jehovahs-witness-blood-transfus
ions-how-a-doctor-works-around-doctrine.html.
299. See, e.g., Dena S. Davis, Does 'No' Mean 'Yes'? The Continuing Problem of Jehovah's
Witnesses and Refusal of Blood Products, 19 SECOND OPINION 37 (1994).
300. Trisha Torrey, Do Patients Have the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment?
VERYWELLHEALTH https://www.verywellhealth.com/do-patient s-have-the-right-to-refuse-tr

eatment-2614982 (last updated Apr. 8, 2018).
301. LEXISNEXIS FIFTY-STATE SURVEYS, HEALTHCARE LAW - MEDICAL TREATMENT:
INFORMED CONSENT (Sept. 2016) (some states apply a "physician standard," others apply
a "patient standard," and a few apply a hybrid standard). Broadly, informed consent laws
require clinicians to inform patients about the benefits and risks of recommended
medical treatment and procedures (including diagnostic tests), as well as alternatives to

those recommendations. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 144, 651 (2018). The definition of
clinician may be supplied by state law. New York, for instance, includes "medical, dental
or podiatric practitioncr[s]" among those required to provide patients with information
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Yet, courts have sometimes compelled capable pregnant
women to submit to care recommended for the welfare of a fetus
even though the woman has refused that care.sos A number of
these cases occurred before development of the modern informed
consent doctrine in the early 1970s.so However, a patient's right
to consent or refuse health care, even if not predicated on
information
provided by a
physician,
antedated
that
development.3 0 5
One might expect the First Amendment to offer further
protection to Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood transfusions.0
But invocation of First Amendment rights has generally not
safeguarded pregnant Jehovah's Witnesses from recommended
blood transfusions.o7 In authorizing blood transfusions to a
pregnantJehovah's Witness in 1964, the SCNJ explained:
We have no difficulty in ... deciding [to compel a
blood transfusion] with respect to the infant child.
The more difficult question is whether an adult may
be compelled to submit to such medical procedures
when necessary to save his life. Here we think it is
unnecessary to decide that question in broad terms
before seeking patient consent to (or refusal of) care. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2805-D
(Consol. 2018).
302. LEXISNEXIS FIFTY-STATE SURVEYS, supra note 301 (providing citations to relevant
state laws in every state). State statutes do not require patient consent in cases involving
emergencies where the patient's condition precludes informed consent if care is to be
given in time to help the patient. Raphael J. Leo, Competency and the Capacity to Make
Treatment Decisions: A Primerfor Primary Care Physicians, 1:5 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 131, 137 (1999).

303. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'1 Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538
(N.J. 1964).
304. See, e.g., Appl. of Pres. & Dir. of G'town Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
305. Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not to Inform?, 71 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 543, 543, 555, n.54 (noting existence of common law consent rules and
noting that the informed consent statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2805-D, entailed

codification of aspects of common law). A few of the legal cases noted in this subsection
involving pregnant Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood fit within the category of court-

identified exceptions to informed consent laws. Id.
306. See Geraldine Koencke Russell & Donald Wallace, Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Refusal of Blood Transfusions: A Balance of Interests, 33 CATH. LAw 361, 364-65 (2017).
307. See, e.g., Appl. of Pres. & Dir. of G'town Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (compelling
Jehovah's Witness patient to receive blood even though she raised a constitutional claim);

see also Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan Mem'l Hosp., 201 A.2d 537 (authorizing that pregnant
Jehovah's Witness receive blood transfusion for sake of "unborn child").
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because the welfare of the child and the mother are
so intertwined and inseparable that it would be
impracticable to attempt to distinguish between
them with respect to the sundry factual patterns
which may develop. The blood transfusions
(including transfusions made necessary by the
delivery) may be administered if necessary to save
her life or the life of her child, as the physician in
charge at the time may determine.sos
In short, legal limits on the right of pregnant women to
make autonomous medical decisions in cases involving compelled
care have been imposed in the name of fetal health and welfare
despite consent rules that presumptively safeguard the patient's
right to refuse recommended care.30" Sometimes that imposition
has been constructed with reference to a more general vision of
limitations on the right of parents to refuse medical care deemed
1
necessary for newborn children, as well as for older children. o
Courts have ordered that blood be transfused to very ill children
when recommended by the children's clinicians, even in cases in
which the children's parents refused on religious grounds to
31
consent to the procedure for their child. These cases are part of

308.

Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan Mem'l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 538.

309.

See Pamala Harris, Note, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: The

Balancingof Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 133, 134, 152-57 (2001).
310. See, e.g., State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995), rev'd, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997) (concluding that viable fetus is a "child" within the
meaning of the [state's] juvenile law and allowing internment of pregnant woman who
used drugs during pregnancy in order to place fetus in protective custody); see also In re

Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990). The New York Family Court
opined: "The State through the Family Court has inherent power to protect and promote

the welfare of young children under the parens patriae doctrine. The State authority to
protect the viable fetus has its origins in Roe v. Wade." Id. at 449.
311. Karen L. Diaz, Rights of Parents: Refusal of Medical Treatment Based on Religious
Beliefs, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 85, 86 (2007). In these cases, lower courts often
invoke the Supreme Court's decision in Prince v. Mass, which notes that "[p]arents may be
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they arc free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full

discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." Prince v. Mass, 321 U.S. 170
(1944). In 1991, Massachusetts's highest court ruled in separate cases that a child could
be given blood transfusions deemed medically necessary to restore her to good health
despite the objections of her Jehovah's Witness parents, and that an adult Jehovah's
Witness, refusing blood transfusions recommended to deal with a bleeding ulcer had the
right to refuse recommended medical care. AP, Court Says Ill Child's Interests Outweigh
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a broader paradigm that authorizes medical care deemed
necessary for children even in cases in which parents refuse to give
their consent.312
Further, a mid-twentieth century court conditioned a
mother's right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds
on her obligation to stay alive for the sake of her young
children.3 1 3 Subsequently, courts have noted that rule-though
they have generally not followed it-in cases involving pregnant
women refusing transfusions. 1 Even so, cases involving pregnant
women who are Jehovah's Witnesses continue to occasion
interpretational dispute.
Increasingly, however, such cases
similar to others that involve proposed medical interventions
during pregnancy respect the pregnant woman's right to exercise
decisional autonomy in consenting to or refusing recommended
care.316

Subsections i and ii of this Section consider cases
occasioned by a pregnant Jehovah's Witness refusing a blood
transfusion. Subsection i considers a case reviewed by the ethics
consult service at Brookside Hospital. Then, Subsection ii
considers cases involving similar facts that were resolved in courts
of law. Subsection iii compares the process, focus, and resolution
of the two sets of cases.
i. An Ethics Consult for a Pregnant Jehovah's
Witness Refusing a Recommended
Blood Transfusion
JT's case was brought to the ethics consult service by a
clinician who sought the service's assistance in responding to a
Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/16/us/courtsays-ill-child-s-interess-outweigh-religion.html.
312.

See infra note 323 and accompanying tcxL

313.
314.

Appl. of Pres. & Dir. of C'town Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
See, e.g., In re Dubreu il, 603 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1992) (concluding

that pregnant women who were parents already should not "neglect [the] fundamental

duty 'to their children' on the basis of 'religious beliefs"'), quashed, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
1993) (noting that existing children would not be left parentless if mother died since
father would be available as parent); Rosamund Scott, Autonomy and Connectedness: A Re-

evaluation of Georgetown and its Progeny, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 55, 55 (2000) (finding the
right of a woman's infant to be raised in a two-parent family to outweigh the woman's

right to refuse a blood transfusion).
315. See Gribow, supra note 296, at 182-86.
316. See id. at 179.
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7
conflict between a pregnant patient and the medical team. JT
had arrived at Brookside in labor,'3 1 though only twenty-five weeks
pregnant.3 19 She gave birth on the day of her arrival at the
hospital."o Thus, as it played out, the case focused on reaching a
321
medical decision for both JT and her newly delivered infant.
The baby's doctors concluded that a blood transfusion was
medically necessary to safeguard the baby's welfare, and perhaps
to save its life. 2 JT, a Jehovah's Witness, refused to consent to a
blood transfusion for the newborn baby.' While still pregnant, JT
had requested all medical care deemed important for the babyonce-born except for a blood transfusion.3 24
Called by an obstetrical nurse on the day of JT's admission
to Brookside, the ethics consult team was quickly informed about
32 5
Before the
JT's medical condition, as well as that of the fetus.
baby's delivery the ethics consult team spoke with JT and her
clinicians (including an attentive obstetrical nurse and an
obstetrician) ." That nurse and physician had already talked with
7
JT about the baby's likely need for a transfusion, once born.
They had informed JT that hospital policy provided for giving
blood transfusions to a minor in need of blood, even if the parent
or parents objected, upon the consent of two physicians who had
32 8
concluded that a transfusion was necessary to protect the child.
The ethics team reported that JT was fearful and felt vulnerable
for herself and for the fetus.3 29
JT was not given a blood transfusion while pregnant, but as
hospital policy dictated, JT's baby was given a transfusion soon
after his birth.3 Mter she delivered the baby, JT was informed
that the infant had been resuscitated and that he had been given

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
membranes had ruptured prematurely several weeks earlier. Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Cf id.
Id. at 1.

JT's
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blood."' The ethics consult team sought the help of a Jehovah's
Witness liaison from the Watchtower Society in order most
effectively to communicate with JT about her religious needs and
preferences.' The liaison spoke with JT and her clinicians,
helping to mediate among them. 3 JT reported to the ethics
Fellow who was serving with the ethics consult team that she had
spoken with the Watchtower Society liaison and with her clinicians
about the transfusion given to the child and that she accepted the
hospital's decision to provide blood to her baby.334 Despite that,
she hoped that more blood would not be given to the infant.3 35
However, the baby received an additional transfusion.3
The ethics team defined the key bioethical principles at
issue in JT's case as a conflict between JT's autonomous right to
make medical decisions for herself and her young children and
the clinicians' obligation to provide beneficent, non-harmful care,
to both JT and the newborn infant.33 7 The team expressly
differentiated between the right of the patient to make decisions
for care while pregnant and her more limited right to refuse care
deemed medically necessary for the infant.338 Further, the team
placed great value on sustained communication between JT and
her clinicians.33 ' That was understood as an essential component
of beneficent care for JT.3 ' The team noted the central
importance of providing continuing support to JT during the early
months of her child's life, support that respected JT's religious
beliefs, even as it was deemed important to bypass those beliefs in
providing care for JT's infant baby. 4 1 JT responded with gratitude
that her baby was well-treated.
Yet, she expressed regret about
the need to transfuse the child.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
Cf id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id.
Cf id. at 1.
Id.
See id.
Cf id.
Cf id.
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JT's acceptance of the hospital decision, modulated by her
regret about the need to give blood to her baby, seemed to have
been grounded in her trust for one clinician who supported JT
throughout her hospitalization at Brookside."' As reported by the
4 5 In fact, JT's
ethics consult service, JT felt that she was "heard."
very premature baby did well, and JT, who might have been deeply
angered had she not enjoyed the respect and attention of hospital
clinicians and of the ethics consult service, continued to seek
medical care at Brookside and at its clinics in the years following
the baby's birth.3 46
The ethics team, with the support and assistance of the
mother and the baby's clinicians, had access to and understanding
of the medical issues at stake. 34 7 Further, the team framed its own
deliberations and responses with its determination that JT's case,
and that of her newborn baby, involved a conflict among (1)
respect for the mother's right to make autonomous medical
decisions, both for herself and her child; (2) the need to protect
the life of a minor, even in the context of parental dissent (an
obligation of beneficence); and (3) an obligation to support JT
and to show respect for her religious beliefs." In addition, they
shaped the process of responding to JT's needs and those of her
infant in light of relevant law.349 The team's continuing
communication with JT during the period of her baby's
hospitalization and the team's involvement and guidance from the
liaison from the Jehovah's Witness Watchtower Society were
5
important components of a successful ethics consultation. o
ii. Legal Cases Involving PregnantJehovah's
Witnesses
This Subsection reviews two legal cases, each involving
conflicts similar to those at the center of JT's case. The first legal
case involves a trial court decision rendered at a time during
which there were few appellate decisions of relevance to which the

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See id.
Cf id.
Cf id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trial court might look.3 1' The second case, an Illinois appellate
court decision, offers a useful framework from within which to
consider the ethics consult service's work withJT and In rejamaica
Hospital.... The right defined by the Illinois appellate court was
respected fifteen years later by the hospital and clinicians involved
in caring forJT.

a.

5

In rejamaicaHospital

Jamaica Hospital in New York City initiated In re Jamaica
Hospital3 5 4 in order to compel aJehovah's Witness, eighteen-weeks
pregnant, to submit to a blood transfusion deemed medically
necessary for the woman and the fetus. 5 5 Justice Lonschein noted
that when called by a hospital lawyer, he was "getting dressed for a
dinner engagement;"35 ' he then instructed the hospital's lawyer to
call the justice then assigned to "special term," but he agreed to
conduct the hearing upon learning that the justice in question
could not be located." Given the patient's serious medical
condition, Justice Lonschein "dispense [d] with the 'usual
formalities"' including "assignment of counsel, notice to [the
patient's] family and testimony in a courtroom setting with
stenographic record." 35 8

Justice Lonschein asked the patient if she would consent to
a transfusion;35 9 she refused. 3 6 Justice Lonschein then appointed
an attending physician as "special guardian for the unborn child,"
authorizing that doctor to compel the patient to undergo a
transfusion if that seemed necessary to save the life of the fetus. 3

1

Justice Lonschein opined that if the patient's "life were the only
one involved here, the court would not interfere."3

He further

351. In rejamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1985).
352. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. CL 1997).
353. Id. (finding that a woman has a right to make medical decisions for herself while
pregnant and after delivery, but not as broad a right to make medical decisions for her
infant child).
354. In rejamaicaHospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898.
355. Id. at 899.
356. Id. at 898.
357. Id. at 899.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 900.
362. See id. at 898.
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acknowledged that the "unborn child" was not yet viable3 " and
that abortion would still be possible under the framework
established in Roe v. Wade.364 Yet, he referred to the fetus as a
"potentially viable human being in a life-threatening situation. "365
Justice Lonschein wrote:
While I recognize that the fetus in this case is
viable, and the State's interest in protecting
yet
not
its life would be less than "compelling" in the
context of the abortion cases, this is not such a case.
In this case, the State has a highly significant
interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus,
which outweighs the patient's right to refuse a
blood transfusion on religious grounds.3 6 6
The patient appeared to have had almost no role in the
proceedings.36 ' Her personhood was barely acknowledged, and
the court showed no interest in her needs and values. 368 The
decision contrasts sharply with the approach of the hospital ethics
consultants inJT's case."
b.

People v. Brown (In re Brown)

'

Almost a dozen years later,o a circuit court judge in
7
Illinois reached a decision at odds with In re Jamaica Hospital.1
The court appointed a hospital administrator as "temporary
custodian of Fetus Brown" and authorized that administrator to
consent to a blood transfusion for Darlene Brown, who was about

363. See id. at 900.
364. Id. at 899-900 (acknowledging that "the State's interest in protecting [the] life
[of the fetus] would be less than 'compelling' in the context of the abortion cases, [but]
this is not such a case").

365. See id. at 899.
366. See id. at 900.
367. See id. at 899-900.
368. See id. The emergency in In rejamaicaHospital was time sensitive, but so was that
ofJT, which was considered by Brooksidc's ethics consult service. See id.; see also Pregnancy
Case P20123, supranote 27.
369. Compare In rejamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (appointing a guardian to act in
the interests of the fetus), with Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
370. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
371. Id. But see In rejamaicaHospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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thirty-four weeks pregnant.1 2 A transfusion was administered to
Brown that evening for the sake of Brown's fetus. 37

3

Brown "tried

to resist the transfusion and the doctors 'yelled at and forcibly
restrained, overpowered and sedated' her."3 7 " Although the trial
court "closed the case," after she gave birth and was discharged
from the hospital with her infant," Brown appealed the court's
decision to appoint a custodian who was given authority to order
that Brown receive a transfusion against her wishes.
Limitations of the trial court proceedings in this case3 77

again suggest that trial courts are not equipped to respond to
medical crises. 78 From Brown's perspective, that seemed
abundantly clear. 7 Yet, the appeal that she initiated resulted in a
higher court's re-shaping state law for women in the future who
might find themselves in Brown's situation.3 0
Brown's appeal encouraged the appellate court to respond
to a question that had been expressly left open by an earlier
Illinois court, precluding clinicians from performing a procedure
"as invasive as a cesarean section," but that queried whether that
conclusion should apply in the context of a transfusion.si In that
earlier case, Baby Boy Doe," the court commented by way of dicta
that a transfusion (presumably in comparison to a cesarean) is
"relatively noninvasive and risk-free."38 3 That claim, as the
appellate court in Brown suggested, is not accurate from a medical
372.

In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 399-400.

373. Id. (emphasizing the doctor's medical opinion that the only way to get oxygen to
the placenta was through the mother's blood).
374. See id. at 400.

375.

Id.

376. See id.
377. See infra notes 378-94 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of the
trial court's decision in In re Brown).
378. See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 399-401.
379. See id. at 400-02.
380. See, e.g., People v. Tinisha L.-B (In re Harriett L.-B.), 50 N.E.3d 1222, 1236-37
(1ll. App. Ct. 2016) (citing In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405) ("[r]espondent is correct that a
woman, even one who is pregnant, has the right to refuse medical treatment."); Order at
21-22, Major v. Cty of Cook, 2014 IL App (1st) 123632-U, 151 (citing In re Brown, 689
N.E.2d at 405) ("The state may not override a pregnant woman's competent treatment
decision, including the refusal of recommended invasive medical procedures, to
potentially save the life of the viable fetus.").
381. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 401-42 (citing People v. Doe (In re Doe), 632 N.E.2d
326 (Ill. App. CL 1994)).
382. In reDoe, 632 N.E.2d 326.
383. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 401 (quoting In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 333).
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point-of-view, but even more, blood transfusions carry significant
risk from the perspective of a believing Jehovah's Witness."' The
trial court in Brown had seemed unaware of, or uninterested in,
that risk. 8
In responding to the challenge raised by Brown's appeal,
the Illinois appellate court noted first that common law, as well as
the United States and Illinois Constitutions, protect a competent
38
adult's right to refuse recommended medical care. ' However,
the court also explained that in certain cases, the state's interest
may "outweigh the interests of the patient in refusing medical
treatment. "38' In that regard, the court identified the "ultimate
issue" in Brown's case as the state's "interest in protecting the
38 8
viable fetus."

In analyzing that issue, Judge Theis rejected the suggestion
that compelling pregnant women to submit to blood transfusions
may not carry the same concerns raised by compelling a pregnant
woman to submit to a cesarean."' Brown's decision to refuse the
recommended blood transfusion, despite her clinicians' concerns,
39 0
should have been respected:
[T]he State may not override a pregnant woman's
competent treatment decision, including refusal of
recommended invasive medical procedures, to
potentially save the life of the viable fetus. We
disagree with the Baby Boy Doe court's suggestion
that a blood transfusion constitutes, a "relatively
noninvasive and risk-free procedure," and find that
a blood transfusion is an invasive medical procedure
that interrupts a competent adult's bodily integrity.
We thus determine that the circuit court erred in

384.

Id.

at 405

(considering

implications

of blood transfusion

for Jehovah's

Witnesses).

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
App. Ct.
390.

See id. at 402-03.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405 (relying on two previous Illinois cases. In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill.
1994); Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (111. 1988)).
Judge Theis distinguished the case from cases involving abortion or maternal

substance abuse as well as from a case involving refusal to allow a blood transfusion for a

minor. Id.
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'

ordering Brown to undergo the transfusion on
behalf of the viable fetus. 9
This decision established a legal framework for subsequent
cases in which pregnant hospital patients refused blood
transfusions deemed medically necessary to safeguard the health
or life of the mother and/or the fetus and offered a model that
other states could follow.

92

The challenge that faced the appellate

court was clearly distinct from that which faced the trial court that
first heard Brown's case and from that which faced the ethics
consult service that participated in JT's care.' In that vein, the
next Subsection compares In re Brown and In re Jamaica Hospital
with JT's case.'
iii. ComparingJT's Case with In re Brown and In re
JamaicaHospital
Both the decision of the court in In re Brown,9 and of the
trial court in In rejamaicaHospital,396 contrast with the work of the
Brookside ethics consult service in JT's case.3 97 As a general
matter, a court proceeding initiated by the hospital providing care
to a patient poses a patient's clinicians and hospital administrators
as antagonists to the patient.39 That situation will almost inevitably
affect the patient and her clinicians and hospital personnel quite
differently than an ethics consult.

391. Id. (citations omitted).
392. See In re Harriett L.-B., 50 N.E.3d 1222, 1236-37 (Ill. App. CL. 2016) (citing In re
Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, for the proposition that a pregnant woman has the right to refuse
medical treatment).

393. See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397; In rejamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y.
Sup. C. 1985).
394. Ethics consult decisions are not mandatory or enforceable. Alessandra
Gasparetto et al., The Notion of Neutrality in ClinicalEthics Consultation, 13:3 PHIL., ETHICS,

8c HUMAN. IN MED. 1, 1 (2018).
395. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397.
396. In rejamaicaHospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898.
397. See supra notes 317-50 and accompanying text (discussing the facts ofJT's case).
398. See In rejamaicaHospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (describing the doctor's testimony
that the patient's unborn child would die without a blood transfusion which the patient
objected to due to her religious beliefs).
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Court proceedings constrain interaction among the
parties." They limit those permitted to participate, and they
compel those involved to follow legal rules about when to speak
and what to say." These rules can easily render a patient
voiceless.4 0 ' The patient can become a character for whom
decisions are shaped by experts-those 'knowing better'-rather
than a person with needs, beliefs, and preferences, often sensible,
even as the patient's preferences conflict with the preferences of
medical and legal experts. 402 An eti
ethics consult may or may not
patient's clinicians applaud;
that
or
patient
a
that
results
to
lead
4 03
In
yet, the patient, as in JT's case, may still feel "witnessed."
the
by
overridden
were
preferences
whose
patients
the
contrast,
N.Y. court in In rejamaicaHospitaland by the Illinois circuit court
4
in In re Brown were marginalized, unheard, and unwitnessed.
The ethics consult service at Brookside had experience
responding to the needs of Jehovah's Witnesses before JT was
admitted to Brookside and was able to contact an expert from the
Watchtower Society to assist with the consult processes by serving
as a liaison between the patient and the clinicians and to support
JT.06 The presence of another Jehovah's Witness who is an expert
in the matters at issue would be likely to reassure any Jehovah's
Witness patient that the nurses, doctors, and hospital respected his
or her beliefs and values. In JT's case, the presence of the
Watchtower liaison harmonized with the approach of the ethics
consult team that sought JT's views as well as those of her

399.

See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,

The Trouble with the Adversary System in a

Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 12-24 (1996) (discussing the
pitfalls in the American adversarial legal system).
400.

See K. Abel, The Role of Speech Regarding Constraints on Attorney Performance: An

InstitutionalDesign Analysis, 19 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 181, 195 (2012).
401. Id.
402. See In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900 (explaining that the judge
found the unborn child to be regarded as a human being and therefore appointed the
doctor to do what was necessary to save its life, including giving the mother a blood
transfusion that was expressly against her religion).
For cases in which a patient lacks capacity, the patient's proxy or surrogate
403.

(often a
patient.
404.
N.Y.S.2d
405.

dear friend or family member) will sit in the role of patient and speak for the
See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In rejamaica Hospital, 491
898.
Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
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doctors." The involvement of an expert from JT's religious group
facilitated respectful discussion among the stakeholders."
Nothing in the court records suggests a similar
accommodation for the patient at Jamaica Hospital or for
Brown." In the end, JT's continued use of the hospital's services
in the years subsequent to the birth of her baby may suggest her
comfort with and appreciation of the process of the ethics consult
and her respect for the clinicians,' despite their disagreement
with her choice and, remarkably, despite the decision to give her
baby a blood transfusion without her consent. 410 In contrast,
Brown went to court again after the birth of her baby in order to
appeal the trial court's order. 4 11 That suggests a very different
response to her clinicians than JT's response to hers. The case of
the patient in Jamaica Hospital was not appealed, and there is no
record suggesting anything about the patient's response beyond
her refusal to submit to a transfusion on religious grounds." Even
the absence from the record of such information is telling. The
patient's responses, it would seem, were of minimal concern to the
court. 413

A comparison of JT's case with Brown and the patient at
Jamaica Hospital is especially significant because each of these
women was compelled to accept a blood transfusion for herself or
her newborn baby. "JT's baby was given a transfusion despite her
refusal; Brown and the Jamaica Hospital patient were given
transfusions while still pregnant, despite their refusal to consent.415
Yet JT accepted what had transpired and may well have been
grateful for the discourse encouraged between her and hospital

406.
407.
408.

See id.
See id.
See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397; In re JamaicaHospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898.

409.

See supra note 346 and accompanying text.

410. Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
411. See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397.
412. See In re JamaicaHospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898.
413. See id.
414. See supra notes 317-50 and accompanying text (discussingJT); supra notes 35469 and accompanying text (discussing the patient atJamaica Hospital); supra notes 37094 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).
415.

See supra notes 317-50 and accompanying text (discussing

JT);

supra notes 354-

69 and accompanying text (discussing the patient atJamaica Hospital); supra notes 37094 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).
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416
clinicians, a process initiated by the ethics consult service. Her
clinicians, hospital administrators, clergy, and others attended to
her situation and respected her religious values even though her
41 7
Brown was patently
newborn infant was given a transfusion.
1 8 One can assumedispleased with the court proceedings.
though again there is no record from which to be certain-that
the Jamaica Hospital patient was distressed by the proceedings of
the New York court that issued the order to authorize a
transfusion despite her choice not to receive blood products and
without attending even minimally to her concerns, beliefs, and
needs.4 19
Furthermore, the ethics consult cases-in sharp contrast
with the court cases-are generally marked by concern to identify
or respond to the moral distress of nurses and physicians in the
context of health care conflicts.4 20 Such distress can have
significant personal consequences for clinicians who face moral
dilemmas about patient care, but are constrained from effecting
4 1
the treatment that seems best to them. ' This can result in
422 The ethics
practitioners experiencing emotional suffering.
consultants, working within Brookside, were keenly aware of the
potential for the clinicians caring for JT to experience moral
distress and worked openly to respond to clinicians' needs as well
as those of the patient. 2' The moral distress of clinicians in cases
such as those of Brown and the patient atJamaica Hospital was not
a component of the issues to which the courts were asked to
respond and was thus not addressed by-and perhaps not even
contemplated by-the courts that rendered decisions in these
cases. 42 4

416.
417.
418.
419.

See Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
See id.
See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
In rejamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1985).

420.

See supra Part I.

421. See, e.g., Sofia Kalvemark et al., Living with Conflicts-Ethical Dilemmas and Moral
Distress in the Health Care System, 58 Soc. Sci. c MED. 1075, 1077 (2004) (describing a study
of moral distress among nurses and physicians in Sweden).
422. Elizabeth Dzeng et al., Moral Distress Amongst American Physician Trainees
Regarding Futile Treatments at the End ofLife: A QualitativeStudy, 31 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 93

(2016).
423. See Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
424. See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In rejamaicaHospital, 491
N.Y.S.2d 898.
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DISPUTES ABOUT MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR NEONATES AND
BABIES

Once, parental decisions about appropriate care for very
sick newborn babies were a private matter, entertained between
parents and clinicians.4 2

1

Increasingly, that is not the case.4 2 6 Such

decisions may now include the participation of hospital
administrators, social workers, bioethicists, attorneys, and judges
and may also be described in public media.4 27 In short, decisionmaking and conflicts about decisions for neonates have entered
the public domain."' Medical, legal, and ethical uncertainties
shape such decisions and the conflicts they engender.2 Further,
these conflicts often reflect broader ideological debate within the
nation.4 30
Importantly, a number of discrepant ideological positions
about responses to treatment for critically ill neonates have
emerged.3 1 Some stem from, and often share in, the volatility of
discourse about abortion in the United States and the difficulties
stakeholders may face in attempting to distinguish between
neonates, especially those who are very premature, and fetuses. 432
Another perspective, however, views parents who seek the
continuation of life-sustaining care deemed "futile" by physicians
as emotional, misguided, and/or unrealistic.4 3

situations

can

stakeholders. 3

engender

confusion

and

'

Each of these

anger

among

the

1

Moreover, conflicts about the appropriate care for seriously
ill neonates, including babies born very prematurely, 435 almost
425. See Craig A. Conway, Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practicaland Philosophical
Influences Impacting Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Marginally-Viable Newborns, 25 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1097, 1104-05 (2009).
426. Id. at 1104-06.
427. See id.
428. Id.
429. See id. at 1103.
430. See id. at 1104-06.
431. See id. at 1106.
432. See id. at 1123 (noting the connection between religious views and the position
that all "human biological existence" is valuable and thus medical care should never be
abandoned).
433. Id. at 1117-19.
434. Seeid.at 1120.
435. Id. at 1114 (categorizing babies born between twenty-two and twenty-seven weeks
as "extremely premature").
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always involve significant medical uncertainty.436 Certain factors
suggest better outcomes,4 3 7 but statistically better (or worse)
outcomes may involve significant uncertainty in particular cases.s
In addition to questions about survival, it is almost impossible to
4 39
George
predict long-term neurodevelopmental outcomes.
Annas has suggested one response to that uncertainty as
dependence on "trials of therapy that can be ended when
4 40
reasonable clinical goals cannot be achieved." Annas added:
More data are unlikely to provide a yes-or-no answer
to whether resuscitation should be attempted at
birth..

.

. Life is not always preferable to death, as

was made clear by the exceptions to the old Baby
Doe regulations (which pertained to refusals of
treatment for disabled, not premature, newborns)
and by the entire series of so-called right-to-die
cases.4'

"

Furthermore, clinicians' individual responses to risk-taking
and individual assessments of the value that they place on
aggressive medical care that is likely to result in only a small
percent of infants surviving among those treated can play a role in
clinicians' treatment recommendations to parents.442
Legal cases involving medical care for seriously ill newborn
babies generally reflect a conflict among the stakeholders, often
44 3
The law
between a baby's parents and his or her clinicians.
4
authorizes parents to make medical decisions for their children.
436. See id. at 1114.
437. Id. at 1115 (noting relevance of baby's sex, multiple fetuses, weight at birth, and
exposure or to antenatal corticosteroids to likelihood of successful outcome for an
extremely premature baby).
438. See id. at 1118.
439. Id.at1116.
440. George J. Annas, Extremely Preterm Birth and ParentalAuthority to Refuse TreatmentThe Case of Sidney Miller, 351 NEw ENG.J. MED. 2118, 2121 (2004).
441. Id.
442. Conway, supra note 425, at 1118-19 (noting that some neonatologists
recommend treatment even if there is only a ten percent chance for "profoundly disabled
survival," while others prefer not to treat babies with less than a "fifty percent chance of
intact survival").
443. Id. at 441.
444. See, e.g., Soo jec Lee, Note, A Child's Voice vs. A Parent's Control: Resolving a
Tension Between the Convention on the Rights of the Child and U.S. Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
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That right can be lost should a parent be found abusive or
neglectful."

An abuse or neglect determination against the parent of an
ill child is a matter for courts, not hospitals." States vary in their
definitions of medical neglect and medical abuse.4 47 Broadly,
medical neglect or abuse refers to a parent's failure to provide
medically necessary care or a parent's administering unnecessary
and potentially harmful treatment to a child." A hospital
administrator or clinician's medical abuse accusation against a
parent can be a powerful deterrent to parents who disagree with
clinicians' recommendations and would otherwise want to have
their child treated in a manner not recommended by a hospital's
clinicians."' In short, such accusations against parents can,
themselves, be abusive.4 5 0
In contrast, many Brookside cases involving medical
decision-making for such babies reflect uncertainty among all of
the stakeholders more often than they reflect outright disputes.45 1
In many of these cases, the ethics consult service began its work
before potential conflicts were clearly identified and before
disagreements hardened. 5 ' Even in cases that involved differences
687, 711 (2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b, (AM. LAW INST.
1964)) (noting that person consenting must have capacity and that consent of child may
be effective if child "is capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and probable
consequences of the conduct consented to").

445. Maxine Eichner, Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of "Medical Child
Abuse, " 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 205, 317 (2016) (concluding that "outside of [a] narrow
range of abuse and neglect cases, decisions about medical care should be the parent's, not
the doctor's or the state's").

446. Id. at 318.
447. See Naomi Shavin, Disagree with Doctors' Diagnosis of Your Kid and You Might Get
Arrested, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119366/
medical-neglect-what-happens-when-parents-and-doctors-disagree.
448. Id.; Eichner, supra note 445, at 210 (reporting on the use of medical abuse
statutes by hospitals to "coerce parents to accept care plans drafted by the hospitals'
doctors, even when the parents do not believe these plans are in their children's best
interests").

449.

See Eichner, supra note 445, at 210.

450.

Id. at 233 (reporting that most states do not provide information on the percent
of abuse cases against parents that involve medical abuse but that there may be as many as

1,600 reports of medical abuse in the U.S. each year).
451. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27.
452. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
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in treatment preferences between an infant's parents and the
infant's health care team, the ethics consult service reports
453
generally do not frame the cases centrally as conflict cases.
Rather, the reports suggest responses that respect the preferences
of all of the stakeholders.4 5 4 In significant part, that may reflect the
character of the Brookside ethics consult service and may not be
widely generalizable as an assessment of ethics consults at other
hospitals.
For both courts of law and ethics consult services faced with
health care challenges or outright disputes involving neonates
determining the appropriate decision-maker or decision-makers
can be central. 5 Courts seem often to favor clinicians when
determining whose view of appropriate care for an ill neonate
should govern.4 56 Brookside's ethics consult service favors
involvement of all the stakeholders and potentially mediation
among them.4 5 7 Many of the service's reports involving care for
neonates proclaim that decision-making should belong to parents

Case 120124, supra note 27. Sometimes the consult service's help is requested in the face
of a set of challenging health care issues, rather than because a clear health care conflict
has emerged.
453. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27.
454. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27. Most of the cases involving ethics consults involved infants
deemed not likely to recover or to dic soon, with or without medical treatment. That may
have made it easier for the service to refrain from defining conflicts opening and
attempting to resolve them. As one ethics report commented, the mother (who disagreed
with the health care team about care options for her infant) was to be given the "tincture
of time to process her circumstances"-presumably time that would have resulted, in any
event, in the infant's death, or in the mother's revising her own understanding of the
preferred treatment options. See, e.g., Infant Case 120171, supranote 27.
455. See Erica Wood, If There is No Advance Directive or Guardian, Who Makes Medical
Treatment Choices?, 37 BIFOCAL 10 (Sept.-Oct. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/
2
content/dam/aba/publications/bifocal/BIFOCALSept-Oct 015.pdf.
1997); In rejamaica Hospital,
Ct.
App.
456. See, e.g., In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill.
491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
457. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27.
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Successful mediation can

produce that result, 4 5 9 but not all mediation has been successful. 460

A. Births at Twenty-Three Weeks Gestation
The ethics consultations at Brookside regarding neonates
and infants in the study period differ from those regarding
pregnant patients-especially in . cases involving conflict or
incipient conflict-in that the responses of the children's parents
(the patients' surrogate decision makers) were colored by deep
uncertainty about the implications of options for care of their
children."' This uncertainty shaped the responses of parents who
agreed with their child's clinicians and those who disagreed.462
Several parents appealed to the miracles of God or put
responsibility for the infant in God's hands."h The parents who
referred to God's miracles had often chosen a path that conflicted
with the path recommended by their child's doctors, but the
parents who described their child's medical future as simply being
in God's hands, one way or the other, had generally accepted the
clinicians' assessments and recommendations.'
i. The Case of Baby Female, "AB"
In late 2012," Brookside's ethics consult service was asked
to assist the parents and the clinicians of a neonate born two days
earlier at twenty-three weeks of gestation." AB weighed 620 grams
458.

See generally Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27;

Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
459. See Autumn Fiester, Bioethics Mediation & the End of Clinical Ethics as We Know It,
15 CARDOZOJ. CONFLcT RESOL. 501, 508 (2014).

460. See id. (noting that mediation is a failure in a situation in which one party to the
mediation "has no conversational space in the dialogue"); Annas, supra note 440, at 2118
(noting that "[a]dvances in neonatology have far outpaced decision-making practices in
the neonatal intensive care unit").

461. Compare Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122, supra
note 27, with Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27.
462. See generally Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27;
Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
463. See Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
464. See Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant Case 120124, supranote 27.
465. Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
466. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27.
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at birth." A chart note entered by one of AB's ethics consultant
declared that birth at twenty-three weeks gestation is "extreme
prematurity."" The ethics consult service offered a statistical
assessment (which does not, of course, serve as a tool for
prognosticating the course of development for AB or any other
specific infant)."' The team reported that three-quarters of the
children born after only twenty-three weeks of gestation are not
4 70
Over ninety percent
alive eighteen to twenty-two months later.
are either dead or "profoundly impair[ed] " within that timeframe;
the report further noted that extreme prematurity involves radical
uncertainty about a baby's prognosis.4 7 1
AB's father wanted his daughter to receive every form of
care that might have helped her.47 2 The mother agreed about all
forms of care except one. 7 She was a Jehovah's Witness and
therefore did not want the child to receive additional blood
transfusions.4 74 The mother ("BB") knew that her daughter had
475
already received two transfusions despite her refusal to consent.
BB, reporting a series of events in her own life that she
characterized as miraculous, expressed confidence that her child
would survive if God willed it. 7 6 That was the case, she opined,
7
whether or not the child received a blood transfusion.
AB's case challenged the ethics consult team, as well as the
baby's parents and her clinicians, because of the multiplicity of
problems that can interfere with the health and developmental
progress of a child born as early in the gestational process as was
AB.1 7' The case also required the ethics consultants and the child's
clinicians to respond to parents who enjoyed equal decisionmaking authority under the law and who did not share a religion

467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Infant Case 120124, supra note 27. 620 grams is equivalent to about 1.3 pounds.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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or a culture and did not agree with each other about all aspects of
AB's care. 7
The medical uncertainty at the center of decisions
regarding AB's care and prognosis shaped the ethics consult
team's review of the ethical principles ("beneficence," "nonmaleficence," and "autonomy"),4 8 0 defined as relevant for those
making decisions about this child's care.48 ' Frequently in their
hospital reports, the ethics consultants rely on relevant medical or
bioethical literature in explaining a case and responses to it.48 2 In
its report about AB, the ethics consult team studded the text with
references to legal, bioethical, and medical authorities.8 The
report invoked a court decision, 484 a state statute, 4851 a federal
regulation, 4 8 6 and the Guidelines on ForgoingLife-Sustaining Medical
Treatment from the Committee on Bioethics of the American
Academy of Pediatrics 48 7 and referred to articles by attorneys,
physicians, and bioethicists. 4 88 It may be that the ethics consultants
included this plethora of references to laws, ethics opinions, and
general commentary in an effort-perhaps not entirely

479. Id. AB's father was the child of immigrants and spent time during his childhood
outside the U.S. Id. AB's mother was an American by birth and socialization. Id. BB
opposed blood transfusions, while AB's father did not Id.
480. See supra note 257 (summarizing the history of these principles in American
bioethics).
481. Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
482. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Pregnancy Case P20122,
supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra note 27; Infant Case 120138, supra note 27; Infant
Case 120124, supra note 27.
483. Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
484. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 256 Wis. 2d 472 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
485. Family Health Care Decisions Act, ch. 8, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 29-CC (2010).
486. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines
Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 Uan. 12, 1984) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84). The proposed regulations were called the Baby Doe
regulations because they were a response to a 1982 medical case in Indiana that involved
the death of a newborn whose parents did not consent to life-saving surgery because the
child was disabled. See George J. Annas, The Baby Doe Regulations: Governmental Intervention

in NeonatalRescue Medicine, 74 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 618 (1984). The Supreme Court found
the regulations unconstitutional

in Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S.

610 (1986).

Congress then amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42
U.S.C. § 5101-07, 5118 (2011). Amended regulations conditioned federal funding on
facilities providing terribly sick infants with aggressive treatment. See Conway, supra note
425.
487

Committee on Bioethics, Guidelines on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment,

93 PEDIATRICS 532 (1994), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/ 93/3/532.
488. See Infant Case 120124, supra note 27, at 2-3.
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conscious-to offer some balance to the uncertainty that
surrounded AB's prognosis that each of the stakeholders had
acknowledged.4 8 9
The ethics consult service's report about this baby's care
did not focus on the conflict between the baby's parents or on that
between her mother and her clinicians. 0 Instead, the report
focused on the difficult path that lay ahead for the infant and her
parents and on the challenge that medical uncertainty about this
1
baby's future presented to all of the stakeholders.4 9 The ethics
consult service expressed continuing readiness to communicate
with and support the child's parents and her clinicians and, if
called for, to mediate among them.49 2 That approach seemed to
serve everyone involved in caring for AB and participating in
decisions about her health care.49 3 Although AB's mother
remained uncomfortable about her daughter receiving blood
transfusions, she accepted that decision, one supported by both
the baby's father and her health care professionals.49 4
The ethics consult report about AB's care delineated
scholarly and legal references and considered many of the issues
more deeply than is typical of the service's reports.9 5 These
references did not resolve the challenges at issue in AB's case, in
part because they reflected varying positions about withdrawing
life-sustaining care from seriously ill neonates.49 6 These references
49 7
included a 2002 Wisconsin case, Montalvo v. Borkovec. The report
described the court in Montalvo as having denied an infant's

489. See id.
490. See id. at 2.
491. See id.
492. Id. at 2-3.
493. See id.
494. See id. at 1.
495. See id. at 2-3.
496. See id.
497. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. CA. App. 2002). Montalvo involved
allegations that a hospital and its doctors were liable for having failed to provide an
infant's parents with the opportunity to consent to life-sustaining care for their child. Id.
at 415-16. A careful review of Montalvo supports the conclusion that the physicians

involved in the care of Nancy Montalvo's baby were facing a medical emergency. Kellic R.
Lang et al., Gavets in the Nursery: An Appellate Court Shuts Out Parents and Physiciansfrom

Care Decisions, 16 ANN. HEALTH L. 263, 267-68 (2007). That-and not the presence or
absence of treatment alternatives-can alone justify the failure to have provided the
parents with an opportunity to consent, on the basis of appropriate information, to the

care provided to their child. Id. at 268.
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parents the right to decide whether to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining care.'" The report also discussed Guidelines composed
by the Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of
Pediatrics ("AAP"), which provided that parents may consent to
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care from an infant if
the infant's survival is deemed very unlikely.4 99 The two views-that
of the Wisconsin court in Montalvo and that of the AAP's Bioethics
Committee-reflect alternative responses to parents refusing
recommended life-sustaining care for a neonate.5 00 These
references suggested that the medical uncertainty that surrounded
AB's care and prognosis was complemented by legal and moral
uncertainty.5 0 ' The ethicists did not note a preference for one
choice over others. 5 02 Instead, the report focused on serving those
involved in AB's care rather than on the conflict among them.0 s
The consultants' final recommendation noted the importance of
ensuring that AB's parents would be privy to continuing
information about their infant's shifting medical condition.50 4
ii. Montalvo v. Borkovec
Emanuel Vila,o5 the son of Nancy Montalvo and Brian Vila,
and AB were both born in the twenty-fourth week of gestation.5 0 6
Both babies weighed between 600 and 700 grams at birth. 0 7 Both
births and the babies' progress in the weeks after their births were

&

498.
Montalvo, considered in Subsection ii, has rarely been invoked in subsequent
cases (in Wisconsin or elsewhere), but see Disability Rights Wis. v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp.
Clinics, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 994, at *17-19 (2014) (distinguishing Montalvo for
involving right of parent to be given information about "refusing life-sustaining treatment

for a child, and . . . not expressly address[ing] a doctor's obligation to provide the
treatment"). Montalvo has been criticized by law review commentators. See, e.g., Lang et

al., supra note 497, at 265.
499.
500.

See Guidelines on ForgoingLife-SustainingMedical Treatment, supra note 487.
The report did not address the apparent conflict between its view of the court's

conclusion in Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413, and the position taken in the Guidelines on
ForgoingLife-SustainingMedical Treatment, supra note 487.

501. See Infant Case 120124, supra note 27, at 2-3.
502. See id.
503. See id.
504. Id. at 3.
505. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413; Infant Case 120124, supra note 27, at 1.
506. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413; Infant Case 120124, supra note 27, at 1.
507. Infant Case 120124, supra note 27, at 1 (noting AB's birth weight as 620 grams at
birth); Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413 (noting that when Emanuel's mother was in labor an
ultrasound revealed that the fetus's weight was estimated at 679 grams).
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"

surrounded by significant medical uncertainty, as well as
uncertainty about the law's perspective and the most fitting ethical
responses.5 0" Emanuel's story resembled that of AB in that the
adult stakeholders in both cases disagreed about the proper
course of treatment for the newborn babies. However, Emanuel's
story differed from that of AB and her parents because the conflict
among the stakeholders in Emanuel's case intensified in the weeks
following his birth.5 09 Acrimony soon defined, and quickly
undermined, the relationship between Emanuel's parents and his
5
clinicians. 1 o Emanuel's parents eventually initiated legal action.
Nancy Montalvo and Brian Vila brought suit against the
physicians who treated Emanuel and against the hospital in which
Emanuel was born and cared for after his birth.5 12 They alleged
that they had not given informed consent for the care provided to
the infant after his birth and thus that the hospital did not have
proper authorization for providing that care."' The trial court
dismissed the complaint.5 1 4 The appellate court affirmed the
Judge Wedemeyer, writing for the appellate court,
dismissal.
concluded that an informed consent obligation would have been
superfluous as there was no choice to be made. The court stated
that "requiring the informed consent process here presumes that
a right to decide not to resuscitate the newly born child or to
withhold life-sustaining medical care actually existed. This premise
is faulty." 1" The court, invoking both state and federal law, offered
several reasons for its conclusion that the law required that
Emanuel be resuscitated after birth and that he receive lifesustaining treatments. 5 1 7 In the court's view, the absence of an

508.
509.

See Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413; Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
See Infant Case 120124, supra note 27; Montalvo, 256 Wis. 2d 472.

510. See Nancy Montalvo & Brian P. Vila, Commentary, Parent's Grand Rounds Speech
on Neonatal Intensive Care Unit Experience, 19J. PERINATOLOGY525, 525-26 (1999).

511.
512.
513.

Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416. The plaintiffs originally sued the obstetrician who performed the

cesarean on Nancy but did not appeal the trial court's conclusion that there was no claim

against this physician "upon which relief could be granted." Id. at 417.
514.

Id. at 416.

515.
516.
517.

Id. at 416, 421.
Id. at 418.
See id. at 417-21.
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alternative made informed consent unnecessary. 1 8 Further, the
court viewed Emanuel's care within the "emergency exception" to
the informed consent rule. 1
At Emanuel's birth "an emergency arose requiring an
immediate response, which occurred."5 2 o At age three, Emanuel
had neurological difficulties.5 2 ' He was unable to speak, eat, or
drink and was fed through tubes.5 22 When Emanuel was two-and-ahalf-years-old his parents described their deflated hopes and
continuing fears:
We cannot help but know the difference between
what is and what should have been. And what future
lies ahead for our severely disabled son when we
pass away or cannot cope any longer? Most likely it
will be the brutality of an institutionalized
existence. . . When people are faced with such
tragedies they often try to find comfort by speaking
of "miracle babies" and "God's will." However, back
when God played God, babies such as our son died
quickly and mercifully at birth.2
The parents queried why Emanuel's clinicians felt
"compelled to 'torture to life' an infant who will never have a
chance at a normal life? .. . All we know is, it was not done
because it was in our son's best interests or in ours." 5 24

518. First, the court opined that life-sustaining care could be withheld or withdrawn
only for patients in a persistently vegetative state, Id. at 418-19 (relying on Edna M.F. v.
Eisenberg, 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997)). Second, the court concluded that pursuant to
the U.S. Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457,
98 Stat. 1749 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.), the state did not permit withholding
"medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening condition."
Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 419. Each of these explanations is severely criticized in Lang et
al., supra note 497, at 266-68.
519. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 420. The emergency exception was recognized as early
as 1914 byJustice Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Soc'y ofNY Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125 (1914). It is
now incorporated in informed consent statutes. See, e.g., Lang et al., supra note 497, at

268-70.
520. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 420.
521. The Ethical Debate Over Micropreemies, CBS NEws (Jan. 31, 2002), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/the-ethical-debate-over-micropreemies/.
522. Id.
523. Montalvo & Vila, supra note 510, at 526-27.
524. Id.
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iii. Emanuel Vila and AB
Emanuel's parents were angry and deeply regretful about
Emanuel's birth and the care he received in the months after his
birth.52" AB's parents were not angry or deeply regretful, even
though AB was given a transfusion despite her mother's
objection. 2 Some part of that difference may be attributed to the
work of Brookside's ethics consult service in mediating the needs
2 However,
and values of the stakeholders involved in AB's care.
the confusion and animosity that defined relationships among the
stakeholders who cared for Emanuel cannot, in turn, be attributed
52
simply to the responses of the Montalvo courts. " Emanuel's case
might not have been brought to court were it not for an apparent
failure of the ethics committee at the hospital where Emanuel was
born to respond expeditiously and effectively to the conflicts
surrounding Emanuel's care.
Emanuel's parents reported in a 1999 article about their
son's birth and neonatal care that they "learned on [their] own
that an ethics committee existed at [the] hospital."" They
requested a consultation with the committee but were told that
that was not possible because the person who headed the
committee was on vacation.5 1' A month later, a meeting was
Vl
5321n
Montalvo and Vila
arranged for the parents with the committee.
described that meeting as a "farce, a mere formality to rubber
stamp the course of action the neonatologists were already
determined to take." 53 ' Then, about a week before Emanuel was
discharged from the hospital, representatives from Child
534 The
Protective Services arrived at the parents' apartment.

525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.

Id. at 526.
Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
See id.
See Lang ct al., supranote 497, at 266-68.
See Montalvo & Vila, supra note 510, at 525-26.
Id. at 525.

531. Id. Ethics committee chairs are entitled to vacations. However, a substitute
should be nominated for the time that the chair is unavailable. Far more worrisome is

Montalvo and Vila's description of the proceedings once an ethics committee convened.
Id. at 525-26.
532. Id. at 525.
533. Id. at 525-26.
534. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).

2019]

RESOLVING HEALTH CARE CONFLICTS

parents' description
disheartening:

of that encounter

and its sequelae

557

is

It was like a scene from an undercover drug
bust . . They interrogated our neighbors in a
search for any incriminating information they could
use against us. . . We have learned through our
contacts with other parents on the Internet that
such retaliations against dissenting parents in the
NICU are common.
iv. Miller v. HCA
Miller v. HCA" similarly involved a baby born near the
twenty-fourth week of gestation. 3 The child survived but did not
flourish.53 " Her parents initiated legal action against the hospital
where their child was born.53 9 They sought compensation for the
enormous expenses they faced caring for their daughter."' Many
years passed between the initiation of suit and a decision by
Texas's highest court, holding against the parents. 5 4 1 After a Texas
appellate court ruled against the Millers, but before the state
supreme court rendered its decision affirming the court below,
Mark Miller expressed his frustration to ajournalist:
We don't need anyone's pity .. . This isn't about
feeling sorry for Sidney or for us. This is about
parents being able to make a choice [about their
child's medical care] .

.

. But [the hospital] forced it

on us . . They decided. Then they took all my
money. Then they washed their hands and said,
'You go home and live with the consequences.' 542

535.
536.
537.

Id.
Miller v. HCA, 118 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. 2003) [hereinafter Miller].
Id. at 761.

538.

See Paul Duggan, A Question of Choice: Sidney Miller Was Born Too Soon. W'ho's

Responsible For Her Life?, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2002, at F3.
539. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 764. The Millers sued the hospital in which their infant was
born and its parent company. Id. They did not sue any of the clinicians involved in caring
for the mother or the baby. See id.

540.
541.
542.

Id.
Duggan, supra note 538, at F.
Id. at F3.
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Just before Sidney's birth at the start of the twenty-fourth
week of gestation," 3 two physicians informed her parents that her
prognosis was dismal.5 '" The parents decided not to attempt
resuscitation at birth. 4 However, a hospital administrator who
had learned about the decision stated that an unwritten hospital
policy provided for resuscitating any baby weighing more than 500
grams and who was born alive. 4 Just before the baby's birth,
treating physicians admitted to significant uncertainty about the
appropriate response to a neonate born as prematurely as
Sidney.5 11 In light of the treating doctors' original grim prognosis,
the parents refused to consent to "heroic measures" for the fetus
at birth.54 8 Their wishes were recorded in the mother's hospital
chart.

549

50
She was
Sidney weighted 615 grams at birth.
5
time, her
over
But
grew.
she
and
She survived,
resuscitated.
5 As she entered adolescence, Sidney
condition did not improve.
5
had the cognitive capacity of the average six-month old. " She had
5
Fluid
diminished eyesight, limb paralysis, and cerebral palsy.
5
the
sued
parents
Sidney's
1992,
In
leaked from her brain.
hospital in which she had been born and HCA, its parent
company, contending that the hospital and HCA were vicariously
liable for violating informed consent obligations in treating Sidney

543. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 763.
544. Id. at 761-462.
545. Id. at 762.
546. Id.
547. Id. (noting that neonatologist present at baby's birth asserted that he "needed to
actually see Sidney before deciding what treatment, if any, would be appropriate").
548. Id. at 762.
549. Id. at 763.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 761.
552. Id. at 764.
553. Id.
554. Holly O'Neal Rumbaugh, Note, Miller v. HCA, Inc.: Disempowering Parents from
Making Medical Treatment Decisionsfor Severely Premature Babies, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 675, 696
(2004). Sidney also had seizures and spastic quadriparesis. Id. At age 13, Sidney was cared
for at home by her mother, was in diapers, and was unable to feed herself or walk. Id. at
696-97.
555. Id. at 696.
556. Id.
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despite her parent's refusal to consent to that care. 5 The parents
did not sue any of the doctors involved in Sidney's neonatal
care.55 ' The Millers' claims against HCA were tried before their
claims against the hospital.5
In 1998, a Texas trial court awarded the Millers over
$60,000,000.560 At the time, Sidney Miller was seven years old.56 ' A

Texas appellate court reversed the jury's verdict for the Millers. 6
The appellate court concluded that parents had a right under
Texas law to refuse life-sustaining care for a child only under very
limited circumstances.
That court opined that Texas clinicians
were not obligated to "follow a parent's instruction to withhold
urgently-needed life-sustaining medical treatment from their
child" unless the "child's condition [had] been certified as
terminal." 56
One justice dissented from the appellate court
6
5
decision.
In the view of dissenting Justice Maurice Amidei, only
a court order would have allowed the hospital to treat Sidney
despite the refusal of her parents to consent to care. 66
The state supreme court, affirming the decision of the
court of appeals, framed its task as deciding whether the child's
parents or her clinicians had authority to make major medical
decisions for her.6 The state's highest court, relying on an

557. HCA v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) [hereinafter HCA, Inc.].
Additionally, the suit alleged that the hospital was liable for failing to have had a policy "to
prevent such treatment without consent." Id.

558. Miller, 118 S.W.3d. at 764.
559. HCA, Inc., 36 S.W.3d at 190.
560. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d. at 764. The jury had awarded the parents of Sidney Miller
$29,400,000 (medical expenses), $13,500,000 (punitive damages), and $17,503,066
(prejudgment interest). Id.
561. Id.
562. HCA, Inc., 36 S.W.3d at 187.
563. Id. at 193-94.
564. Id. at 195.
565. Id. at 197 (Amidei,J., dissenting).
566. Id.
567. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d. 758, 766. (Tex. 2003) ("The case requires us to
determine the respective roles that parents and healthcare providers play in deciding
whether to treat an infant who is born alive but in distress and is so premature that,
despite advancements in neonatal intensive care, has a largely uncertain prognosis.
Although the parties have cited numerous constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases, we

conclude that neither the Texas Legislature nor our case law has addressed this specific
situation.").
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implicit message in a 1920 case,5 " concluded that a physician is
permitted to provide life-sustaining care to a minor, even in the
absence of parental consent, "under emergent circumstances. "569
This conclusion is peculiar because even before the child's birth,
her parents had explicitly opposed providing life-sustaining care
to her."'o The court justified the physicians' caring for Sidney
despite knowing that the baby's parents had refused to consent
because consent became a non-issue in an emergency.57 1
The Millers seemed to have had the authority, under the
state supreme court's reading of the claims brought against HCA,
to have withdrawn life-sustaining care from Sidney once the
7
emergent condition that existed at her birth had receded.
However, they did not do that.57'

That may reflect the difficulty

surrogates face in withdrawing care in comparison to the
74
somewhat less disturbing request to withhold care.' John Paris
and co-authors consider this phenomenon:
Stopping a treatment that is sustaining the life of
their child is, for many parents, psychologically or
morally impossible. Even if assured that the cause of
death would be the underlying disease and not the
withdrawal, these parents continue to believe that
turning off the respirator would "cause" their
child's death. They could never agree to such an
action.57 5

568.

Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920). The case

involved an operation performed on a child without parental consent. The Texas court in
Moss held against the physician, because the child's situation was not an emergency, even

though the surgery in question was needed. Id.
569. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 767. The court defined "emergent circumstances" to
involve a situation in which "death is likely to result immediately upon the failure" to
provide needed care. Id.

570.
571.
572.
573.

Id. at 762.
Id. at 768.
But see id. at 768.
Id.

574. See generally John J. Paris ct al., Has the Emphasis on Autonomy Gone Too Far?
Insights from Dostoevsky on Parental Decisionmaking in the NICU, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q.
(discussing both withholding treatment and
(2006)
HEALTHCARE ETHICS, 147
withdrawing treatment).

575.

Id.
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Parents who may find it impossible to consent to the
withdrawal of care from their child may be relieved when
responsibility for that decision is taken from them:
When,
despite
our
best efforts,
medical
interventions on the extremely premature infant do
not succeed in reversing disease processes, we need
not compound the grief of parents by asking their
permission to withdraw the failed therapies. It is
enough for the parents to agree that in light of their
baby's condition, the focus should be on keeping
the child's final moments as comfortable as
possible. Then the most the physician can do is to
support the parents as they keep company with
their baby in the last stages of its brief life. 7
Mark Miller's response to his daughter, eleven years after
her birth, echoed the perspective described by Paris:
I want people to understand that not once have I
ever wished that Sidney was dead .. . I donated six
pints of blood in nine weeks for that baby. We never
did anything after she was born that would
compromise her. We signed every consent form for
every treatment after the damage was doneanything to alleviate her pain. 7
v. Miller v. HCA: What Might Have Been
Like the parents in Montalvo, and unlike AB's mother,
Sidney Miller's parents 57 8 were angry

and bitter toward

the

hospital in which their baby was born and toward the clinicians
who treated their child.57 1 In all likelihood some part of the
bitterness and frustration felt by Sidney's parents resulted from

576.
577.
578.
579.

Id. at 151.
Duggan, supra note 538, at F3.
Miller, 118 S.W.3d. 758.
Compare supra note 525 and accompanying text (discussing the feelings of the

parents in Montalvo, with supra note 526 and accompanying text (discussing the feelings of

AB's parents), with Duggan, supra note 538, at F3 (discussing the feelings of the parents in
Miller).
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Sidney's compromised condition.so The Millers sought respect
58
and some control over their child's care. ' Their anger,
frustration, and bitterness were grounded in their perception that
they lacked control over their child's care and were paid no
8
respect by those who made health care decisions for Sidney.
The Millers did not claim that Sidney's medical care was
584
negligent.5 83 Her poor outcome may have been unavoidable.
They claimed, instead, that they had the right to authorize
5
withholding care from the infant at birth.5 1 That right was denied
to them, both in the hospital and in court." Had a hospital
ethicist or ethics committee been involved in mediating
disagreements among those involved in medical decision-making
for the Millers' infant-especially disagreements between the
Millers and the baby's clinicians-Karla and Mark Miller might
have felt less isolated and might not have felt that they had been
denied the right to participate in decision-making regarding the
treatment their child received; instead, they felt that their very
personhood had been displaced by presumptive experts who took
almost exclusive control over Sidney's medical decisions.
Especially after Sidney's resuscitation immediately after her
birth, an ethics consultant might have spoken with Sidney's
parents about withdrawing life-sustaining care. Although
surrogates, and especially parents, are often far more reluctant to
withdraw life-sustaining care than to have it withheld initially,
Sidney's parents might have decided to withdraw care with the
support of an ethics consultant and, perhaps, even with the
support of clinicians. Alternatively, the Millers, recognizing that
they were expressly presented with a choice, might have decided
not to withdraw life-sustaining care. Whatever their choice, they
would probably have felt less frustrated and less angry had they

580.

See supra sections IV.A.iv, IV.A.v (discussing Sidney's condition).

581.

See Duggan, supra note 538, at F3.

582.
583.
584.
585.
586.

See id.
Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 764.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 767-68.

587.

See, e.g., William J. Winslade, PersonalReflections on Extremely PrematureNewborns:

Vitalism, Treatment Decisions, and Ethical Permissibility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 931, 937-41
(2009).
588.

See supra note 585 and accompanying text.
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had the opportunity openly to ponder Sidney's medical choices
with supportive ethics consultants and clinicians.
B. ParentsAsking that "Everything"Be Done for Ill
Newborns
Parents of seriously ill newborns respond in different ways
to recommended medical treatments for their infants.' Karla and
Mark Miller did not want their premature infant resuscitated at
birth."'o In other cases, parents' responses to similar challenges
have differed from the responses of the parents whose babies' care
is examined in Section A of this Part.59 ' In the two cases examined
in this Section-one considered by the Brookside ethics consult
service and the other by a court-the parents of seriously ill
newborns asked that "everything" be done for their infants.59 2 In

each case, the child's clinicians had concluded that the infants
could not survive, and thus recommended against life-sustaining
care.59 3

i. The Case of Baby Female "DS"
DS's mother ("RS") 5 14 and the baby's clinicians knew
before the child's birth that she would be born with multiple
medical challenges.59 5 Those challenges involved serious cardiac,
renal, and gastrointestinal abnormalities.5 ' After DS's doctors
consulted with each other, it became clear that the success of
proposed repairs to any of these systems depended on

589. Kathryn L. Weise et al., Guidance on ForgoingLife-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 140
PEDIATRICS 1, 4 (2017), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2017/08
/24/peds.2017-1905.
("Family
decision-makers
may
disagree
with
medical
recommendations ...

because of different perceptions and expectations about the child's

current and future quality of life, different interpretations of the prognosis, or religious
and culturally based beliefs that influence their sense of what is in the child's best
interests.").

590. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 762.
591. Compare Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 762-63, with Hudson v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 177
S.W.3d 232 (Tex. App. 2005).
592. See Infant Case 120124, supra note 27; see also Hudson, 177 S.W.3d 232.
593. See Infant Case 120124, supra note 27; see also Hudson, 177 S.W.3d 232.
594. Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
595. See id. at 1.
596. Id.
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7
improvements in the functioning of the other organ systems.
Each of those repairs was deemed to have been medically
improbable or impossible.5 98
Surgery was performed on the infant soon after her birth,
but a series of medical events resulted in significant deterioration
of the infant's already-compromised medical status.5" The baby's
clinicians explained the child's dim prognosis to her parents and
suggested that the infant be treated only with palliative measures
to keep her comfortable.6 o The parents disagreed with that course
60 1
of care and asked that everything be done to keep DS alive. One
of the baby's doctors sought participation from the hospital's
ethics consult service." At that point, the infant's doctors
estimated that DS would not live for more than days (at the most
weeks), with or without invasive care.0
The ethics consultants identified the central ethical
challenge to involve a conflict between the infant's surrogates'
autonomy-the parents' right to make medical decisions for their
child-and the clinicians' obligation of non-maleficence-the
obligation to refrain from providing treatment that might create a
burden outweighing the benefits.6 0 4 The ethics team referred to an
article published in the Joumal of the American Medical Society
asserting that physicians need not implement patients' requests
for care that the physicians deem extremely unlikely to benefit the
patient.60 5 In the view of DS's clinicians, that was DS's medical
situation and, in consequence, only palliative care to mitigate end6
of-life suffering would benefit DS."

597. Id. DS's cardiac problems required surgery, but that surgery could not be
performed unless the infant's kidney function improved. Id. That would have required

dialysis-deemed extremely unlikely to prove successful given the infant's size and age.
Other recommendations for the baby's care similarly depended on improving the
function of other organ systems which in turn were considered unlikely to respond
favorably to treatment. Id.

598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 1, 4.
602. Id. at 1.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 2.
605. Id. at 2, 4 (referring to A.S. Brett & L.B. McCullough, Addressing Requests by
PatientsforNonbeneficialInterventions, 307J. AM. MED. ASS'N 149, 149-50 (2012)).
606. Id. at 1.

2019]

RESOLVING HEALTH CARE CONFLICTS

565

Rather than expressly denying the parents' preference for
more aggressive care, the ethics team recommended "nudging""
DS's parents toward acceptance of the clinicians' determination.60
As a tool for effecting this nudging, the ethics service invoked the
suggestion that clinicians rely on a "do-not-escalate-treatment"
(DNET) order.60 9 The consult service expected a DNET order
might serve the "best interests of the child," a standard described
as incumbent on all decision makers in the context of a
desperately ill child."' More particularly, the team opined that the
baby's clinicians were not required to provide cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation ("CPR") to DS, despite DS's parents asking that
everything be done for their daughter.' In explaining that
conclusion, the ethics report refers to the harm that CPR would
impose on this very ill and fragile neonate, with almost no
likelihood that the procedure would be successful.
Finally, the ethics team recognized its obligation, as well as
that of the medical staff, not to exclude the parents from
discussions about their child's care. 1
Thus, the team
recommended adhering to the physicians' conclusion that
palliative care alone would serve DS, but modulating that
recommendation within the context of a DNET order and at the
same time, focusing on the profound needs of the child's grieving
parents. 6 14 In this, the parents were assisted by a hospital chaplain
and by the involvement of Child Life.61
607.

Ben Chu, What is 'Nudge Theory' and Why Should we Care? Explaining Richard

Thaler's Nobel Economics Prize-Winning Concept, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2017), https://ww
w.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/nudge-theory-richard-thaler-

meaning-explanation-what-is-it-nobel-economics-prize-winner-2017-a7990461. html (Nudge
Theory is grounded on the notion that people can be subtly encouraged to do what seems
best for them, for their communities, and/or for society rather than penalized for not
doing what seems best).
608. Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
609. Id. at 2 (citing Juliet Jacobson & Andrew Billings, Easing the Burden of Surrogate
Decision Making: The Role of a Do-Not-Escalate-Order,18J. PALLIATIVE MED. 303, 306 (2015)).
610. Id. at 2.
611. Id. at 3-4.
612. Id. The report noted that CPR could not be withheld without the concurrence of
two physicians. Id. at 3. Further, the child's parents would have to be informed of the
decision to withhold CPR. Id.
613. Id. at 3-4.
614. Id.
615. See id. at 4. Child Life specialists work with ill children in hospitals and with their
families to help people cope with "the stress and uncertainty of acute and chronic illness,
injury, trauma, disability, loss and bereavement" What Is a Certified Child Life Specialist?,
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ii. Sun Hudson
Sun Hudson's case6 16 and his mother's responses to the
care recommended for her infant reflect the limitations of a
hospital ethics committee that, apparently in good faith,
attempted but failed to create a context for harmonious decision61
making.6 17 Sun's story resembles that of DS. ' However, Sun's
mother (the only parent involved in the infant's new life) may
have lacked capacity to make decisions for her infant son.6 1 1 Still,

the course of Sun's case offers an important comparison to the
course of DS's case insofar as Sun's mother, like DS's parents,
sought continued treatment for her son, whose clinicians had
recommended that care be withdrawn.62 " The infant's clinicians
had concluded that Sun would die soon in any event and that
continuing life-sustaining care served primarily to prolong the
baby's suffering.' 2 Finally, Sun's case offers a rare comparison
between the work of an ethics committee and a court of law, both
of which responded to Sun's case. 2 There is a record both of the
work of the ethics committee that failed to resolve the dispute with
Sun's mother and the judicial responses.2
Sun was born in 2004 with a serious genetic condition
2
called thanatophoric dysplasia.6 24 The condition is fatal. Wanda
Hudson, Sun's mother, had a different explanation of Sun's
situation.6 26 She told the clinicians at St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital
that Sun had no earthly father, that he was the "son of the sun in

AsS'N CHILD LIFE PROF., https://www.childlife.org/the-child-life-profession

(last visited

Nov. 15, 2018).
616. Hudson v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. App. 2005). This
decision focused on Sun's mother's request that the trial court judge recuse himself. See
3
id. at 2 3.
617. See id.
618. Compare id., with Infant Case 120124, supranote 27.
619.

Conway, supra note 425, at 1126; Lance Lightfoot, Incompetent Decisionmakers and

Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Case Study, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 851, 851
(2005).
620. Id.
621. Conway, supra note 425, at 1125.
622. See Lightfoot, supra note 619 at 852-55.

623.

Id.

624. Hudson v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Tex. App. 2005).
625. Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding
the AppropriateBalance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 261, 282 (2008).
626. Conway, supra note 425, at 1125.
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the sky,"62 and that he would live." In Sun's early weeks of life,
Wanda Hudson was committed involuntarily to St. Luke's
Episcopal Hospital, a psychiatric facility, but was released when
found not to pose a threat to herself or to others.2
Clinicians, ethicists, social workers, and members of the
clergy spoke with Hudson about her baby's medical condition and
impending death.3 She countered their conclusions with her
own, claiming that Sun was normal and simply needed time to
develop.6 1 Under the Texas Advance Directives Act, Sun's care
could be terminated despite his mother's refusal to consent to the
withdrawal of life-sustaining care. 3 Among other things, that step
required review by the hospital ethics committee.3 Hudson, as
the child's surrogate decision-maker, was invited (as directed by
law) to participate in the ethics committee's deliberation.6 34
Moreover, the committee's agreement with the clinicians about
the withdrawal of care gave the patient (here the patient's
mother) the right to ask for an alternative health care facility. 3
Despite the efforts of Texas Children's Hospital to identify a
hospital willing to admit Sun, dozens of hospitals refused to accept
him as a patient.63 6
Texas Children's Hospital then took an unusual step by
helping Hudson find and pay for an attorney.3 7 She sued Texas
Children's Hospital in November 2004.63 Several months later, a
Texas probate court judge sided with the hospital against Hudson
and authorized the withdrawal of life-sustaining care for Sun. 3 In

627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.

Lightfoot, supra note 619, at 852.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 853.
Halevy, supra note 625, at 283 (reporting that forty hospitals declined to accept

Sun as a patient).

637.
638.
639.

Lightfoot, supranote 619, at 854.
Halevy, supra note 625, at 282.
Id. at 283.
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March 2005, Sun's respiratory tube was removed.'o He died in his
mother's arms.

641

The failure of the ethics committee at Texas Children's
Hospital to mediate among the parties' conflicting perspectives
642
Sun's story was also unusual; it
was atypical for that committee.

must be viewed as an outlier among cases involving seriously ill
neonates in that Sun's mother may well not have been capable of
making medical decisions for her infant.64 3 That notwithstanding,

"

Sun's story does suggest that some bioethical conflicts can elude
6
even the most attentive ethics committees.
V.

CONTRASTS BETWEEN COURT RESPONSES AND ETHICS

CONSULT RESPONSES TO HEALTH CARE CONFLICTS

The process of resolving health care conflicts can be
daunting for judges, who do not often handle cases involving
4
health care conflicts, and for bioethicists, who do it daily. Each
forum has advantages and disadvantages.'
This Part, summarizing and further analyzing materials
presented in previous Parts of the article, focuses explicitly on the
comparative advantages of engaging ethics consultants versus
engaging courts in the review of health care conflicts. Comparative
disadvantages of each mode of review are noted as well, though
often implicitly, by way of comparing each forum's advantages

640. Leigh Hopper, Baby Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Removal from Life Support,
Hous. CHRON. (Mar. 15, 2005), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Ba
by-born-with-fatal-defect-dies-after-removal-1498268.php.
641. Id.
642. Lightfoot, supra note 619, at 851. Lance Lightfoot, a hospital attorney at Texas
Children's Hospital and members of the Ethics Committee involved in Sun's case asserted
that "[t]he vast majority of ethics consultations at Texas Children's result in some form of
compromise and resolution between the patient's family and the patient's physician(s)."

Id.
643.
644.

Id.
See id. at 854-855. Lance Lightfoot, an attorney at Texas Children's Hospital

during Sun's hospitalization there and, as such, a member of its ethics committee, has
recommended implementing procedures to replace surrogates deemed incompetent. Id.

645.
646.

See supra Parts II and III.
See infra Part IV.A. Inevitably, court review and ethics consult review may differ,

respectively, from court to court and from hospital to hospital. Both individual judges and
individual ethics consultants may be more or less competent. Thus, to some extent, the
comparative successes and failures of court review and ethics consult review may depend

on the identity of the individual heading the decision-making process in each setting. See
supra Part IV.
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with those offered by the other. The comparisons suggested in this
Part are grounded on analysis of qualitative data presented in
earlier Sections of the article.
Relying on discussion of matching ethics consultations and
court cases in earlier Sections of the article, Section A of this Part
discerns the comparative benefits brought to the resolution of
health care conflicts by ethics consultants in hospitals, on the one
hand, and those brought by the judicial process, on the other.
Then, Section B considers institutional shifts that might enhance
the benefits of each mode of responding to health care conflicts
for patients, their clinicians, their family members, and their
surrogate decision-makers.
A. ComparingModes of Reviewing and Resolving
ClinicalBioethics Conflicts
Each of the stories described in this article, some told by
judges and some by ethics consultants, is challenging. Most reflect
strong emotional responses from stakeholders-emotions ranging
from hope to despair, from anger to complacence, from confusion
to acknowledgment. Many of the stories retold here are troubling,
not only because they involve illness and sometimes death, but
also because the challenges the participants faced often involved
significant medical uncertainty that can exacerbate conflicting
relationships among stakeholders."'
The responses of the stakeholders were often colored by
the successes or failures of the medical treatments offered, but
that is only part of the story. 648 Even stories with undesired endings
can leave stakeholders with a sense that their views matter-with a
sense of having been witnessed within the process that surrounds
their or their loved ones' medical care." This is also the case for
clinicians."o The moral distress that clinicians experience in
caring for ill patients, especially in the presence of patientclinician conflict, can be severe.
Many bioethicists and others have delineated the benefits
and drawbacks of involving hospital ethics consultants in health
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.

See, e.g., supra Parts II and III.
See supra Parts II and III.
See Scott, supranote 5, at 381.
Id. at 370.
Id.
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care conflicts. 5 This article joins that set, but with a specific focus,
a product of the scope of research on which its analysis has
depended. 5 3 The ethics consult reports that are compared with
matching legal cases in this article suggest that ethics consultation
can benefit stakeholders as courts generally do not and cannot,
but that court decisions-especially those resulting from appellate
review-can be invaluable to society's attempts to meet bioethical
Court cases, decided by judges and sometimes
challenges.5
reported on in public media, offer society a context within which
to reconsider its assumptions and reshape its preferences.
Ethics consult services, mediating health care conflicts
through careful focus on the beliefs and values of stakeholders,
can empower patients and family members with the realization
5
that they have been witnessed; their voices have been heard.
6 57
That alone can alleviate the stress of a health care conflict. It is
not a reflection of or a substitute for respect for patient autonomy,
5
often heralded as a central principle of clinical ethics. But it may
be of equal significance insofar as ethics consultations can
empower patients or their family members even though their
preferences are not implemented.6 59 That happened, for instance,

652. See, e.g., ASBH, CORE COMPETENCIES, supra note 33 (listing goals of healthcare
ethics consultation); Sally E. Bliss et al., Measuring Quality in Ethics Consultation, 27 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 163 (2016) (using post-consultation satisfaction surveys to measure the
quality of ethics consultation); Scott, supra note 5, at 377 (noting role of ethics consultants

may include, among other things, "individualized coaching"); Amy T. Campbell et al.,
How Bioethics Can Enrich Medical-Legal Collaborations, 38 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 847, 853
(2010) (ethics committees or consultants may "offer a different perspective on a vexing
case" and may "reorient parties to common goals"). But see Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Hospital Ethics Committees as the Forum of Last Resort: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 76

N.C. L. REv. 353 (1998) (noting comparative disadvantages of ethics consults as compared
with court review).
653. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting source of ethics consult reports
reviewed in this article).

654. See supra Parts II and III.
655. See, e.g., supra Parts 11 and III.
656. Scott, supra note 5, at 381 (citing Nancy M. King, Who Ate the Apple? A Commentary
on the Core Competencies Report, 11 HEC FORUM 170, 174 (1999)).
657. Scott, supra note 5, at 399.
658. See, e.g., ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER & WILLIAM WINSLADE, CLINICAL
ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH To ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 47-48 (7th

ed. 2010).
659. See supra Parts II and III.
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for BB whose child, AB, was given a blood transfusion despite BB's
refusal to consent.

6

60

Correlatively, ethics consultants encourage relationships
among stakeholders. 6 ' Although Brookside's ethics consult
service's written reports sometimes denote the central ethical
challenge in a case in terms of conflicts among autonomy,
beneficence and, non-maleficence-principles that have become
foundational in American bioethicS 6 6 2-the
ethics team at
Brookside often enables parties to surmount conflicts among
autonomy, beneficence, and/or non-maleficence by encouraging
the development of relationships.6 63 That encouragement and its
successful consequences were significant for CO and the clinicians
involved in CO's pregnancy care.6 64 A conflict between CO and
her clinicians about the advisability of an immediate cesarean
(with CO opposing that option) was transformed into an
accommodation that favored CO's preference for continuing her
pregnancy while, at the same time, she agreed to reconsider her
medical choices with her clinicians if her medical status or that of
the fetus deteriorated.66 ' This accommodation respected CO's
personhood and acknowledged her capacity to make a medical
choice for herself and her fetus that differed from the choice
recommended by her clinicians.6 Moreover, the accommodation
made sense to CO's clinicians. 6 7
CO's case illustrates the significance of nuance and process
to the success of ethics consultations." Skill at discerning nuance
and attending to process can be essential to the satisfaction of
stakeholders.6 69 Those skills may produce results ultimately as
important to stakeholders as final determinations.

660.

Id.

661.

See Scott, supra note 5, at 382.

&

662. See generally Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27; Infant Case 120171, supra
note 27; Infant Case 120138, supranote 27; Infant Case 120124, supra note 27.
663. Id.
664. Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27.
665. See id.
666. See id.
667. See id.
668. See id.
669. Cynthia M.A. Geppert & Wayne Shelton, Health Care Ethics Committees as Mediators
ofSocial Values and the Culture ofMedicine, 18 AMAJ. ETHICS 534 (2016); James A. Tulsky
Bernard Lo, Ethics Consultation: Time to Focus on Patients, 92 AM. J. MED. 343, 344 (1992)
(noting increase in "everyone's satisfaction" when physicians are encouraged to "engage
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Other advantages of ethics consultations reflected among
these cases follow from the ethics team's construction and
operation within hospitals. These include the team's accessibility,
70
timeliness, and familiarity with medical care.1 For instance, the
ethics consult service that responded to JT and her clinicians was
at work almost immediately after JT arrived at the hospital in
7
The
active labor in her twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.'
enhanced
care
JT's
in
involvement
early
and
service's accessibility
the ability of the ethics consult service to respond with significant
6 72
success to the conflict about care between JT and her clinicians.
The ethicist who managed this case was herself a physician." But
even non-clinician ethicists in hospital settings have greater
experience with and expertise in understanding the facts and
nuances of medical stories than do most judges." Ethics
consultants also have the flexibility to reshape and restore
conversation should a patient or patient's surrogate dismiss
implications of the conversation.
If an ethics consultant fails to resolve a health care conflict,
the patient and the hospital can seek redress in court. The
emotional and financial costs of a decision to seek a legal
resolution can be high, but the opportunity for court review is
essential. 7' An ethics consult may be unsuccessful for a variety of
reasons. The case of Sun Hudson illustrates that possibility despite
a committed ethics committee.6 76 Parties to an ethics consultation
may be distressed by the lack of clear rules about fair process. At
least in theory, judicial proceedings are governed by rules aimed
at establishing fair process. Further, judges may be more objective
than ethics consultants at least insofar as they are institutionally

in dialogues" with patients); John Tuohey, Ethics Consultation in Portland, 87 HEALTH
PROGRESS (2006) (noting the importance of facilitating "respect for both patient choices
in the absence of decision-making capacity and patient decisions made when such

capacity is present.").
670. See, e.g., supra Parts II and Ill.
671. See Pregnancy Case P20123, supra note 27.
672. See id.
673. See id.
674. Compare Pregnancy Case P20122, supra note 27, with In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235
(D.C. 1990) (en banc).
675. See Hirsch & Donovan, supra note 14, at 267.
676. See supra Part I1l.B.2.
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distinct from those working within the hospital." Justice Liacos,
in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz opined that
judges are more "detached but passionate" than "any other group
purporting to represent the 'morality and conscience of our
society,' no matter how highly motivated or impressively
constituted. "67
Moreover, court decisions, after exhaustion of the right to
appeal, are enforceable. 7' That limits uncertainty, and judges'
decisions, at least those issued by appellate courts, are available to
the public"o and serve as legal precedent or as models for future
cases raising similar issues." Sometimes appellate decisions
responding to health care conflicts reshape society's options and
perspectives.68' A string of court cases dealing with questions about
the right to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining care from patients
without capacity served this function at the turn of the twenty-first
century.6 " This set of cases, which began with In re Quinlanin New
8 ' and
Jersey in 1976 and included Cruzan v. Directo?"
Schindler v.

677. Ethicists may exhibit biases that favor clinicians or hospitals over patients.
Awareness of this potential for bias can go far toward ameliorating it. Further, procedures
can be put in place that preclude egregious instances of bias. These might include inviting
the patient (or his or her surrogate) to attend decision-making meetings.

678. 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1977).Justice Liacos's view here seems laudable as an
ideal. It does not seem to reflect a universal reality.
679.

Appeals, UNITED

STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-cou

rts/types-cases/appeals (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
680.

Court Records and Proceedings: What is Public and Why , CONNOR REPORTING, https:

//connorreporting.com/court-records-proceedings-public
(last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
However, many of the trial court decisions of relevance to this article were not, in fact,
made public. Information about those judges' reviews was garnered from the decisions of
high courts, scholarly commentary, and media reports.
681.

Researching judicial Decisions, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/

help/judicial-decisions.php (last updated June 9, 2015). In addition, court decisions can
provide ethics consultants with an understanding of the law's limits in responding to
health care conflicts.
682. Simon Helfgott, The Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Medical Affairs,
Healthcare Policy, THE RHEUMATOLOGIST

(Oct.

1I, 2016),

https://www.the-rheumato

logist org/article/impact-u-s-supreme.-court-decisions-medical-affairs-healthcare-policy/?
singlepage=1.
683. See, e.g., infra notes 684-86 and accompanying text.
684. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (finding
state's reliance on "clear and convincing evidence" standard for discerning patient's preincapacity preferences, constitutional in case involving request by incapable patient's
surrogate to terminate life-sustaining care).
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Schiavo,68 5 encouraged society and thus legislators to reexamine
686
responses to end-of-life options.
Court proceedings and judges' decisions in cases such as
7
these have stimulated social discourse.1 That discourse provides
grist for the public mill and thus enables society to reconsider and
reshape its responses to illness and health. Public interest may also
coalesce around a case being considered by a hospital ethics
consult service rather than by a court, but this is less common, in
part because hospitals are obliged to protect patient privacy and
because in-hospital resolution of such conflicts has no value as
precedent and may thus be of less interest to a wider
community.6 8
At the same time, the law can too easily level a challenge
presented by a moral dilemma with the presumptive certainty of a
legal rule.' 8 Judith Hendrick has suggested that, for this reason,
the law may emerge as "more a menace than a friend and
certainly a poor substitute for moral consensus." 9 o Additionally,
she states:
[L]egal intervention almost inevitably leads to
"legalism"-a process Callahan describes as the
translation of moral problems into legal problems;
the inhibition of moral debate for fear that it will be
so translated, and the elevation of the moral
judgments of the courts as the moral standards of
the land.
She cautions that the difference between "what should be
done morally" and "what needs to be done legally" should be
attended to and preserved for, if the two merge, clinical ethics

685.

See Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (111th Cir. 2005) (siding with husband,

against parents, of incapable patient in a persistent vegetative state; husband wanted lifesustaining care terminated).

686. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Ten Years After Terri Schiavo, Death Debates Still Divide Us:
Bioethicist, NBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/
bioethicist-tk-n333536.
687. See id.
688. See, e.g., Hendrick, supra note 32, at i52.
689. Id. at i50.
690. Id.
691. Id. (citation omitted).
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committees "become little more than legal watchdogs whose only
function is to promote adherence to law." 692

B. The Future
Ethics consult services 69 3 and courts serve different
functions in responding to bioethical conflicts.' Moreover, each
forum sometimes assists with the functions of the other.9 Courts
called upon to resolve bioethical conflicts have sometimes
suggested that such cases would better be handled by ethics
committees than by courts or have depended on the findings of
hospital bioethicists.69 6 Bioethicists and others engaged in
responding to such conflicts through ethics consult services have
sometimes sought resolutions in court or even supported a
patient's seeking a resolution in court.69 7
Ethics consult services are better equipped to respond to
such cases than are courts and offer a more appropriate setting for
responding to stakeholders' needs and values than do courts. 9
They are able to mediate among stakeholders' disparate
preferences, while acknowledging the personhood of patients,
family members, and clinicians.6 99 Courts, on the other hand, can
define moral limits for the parties to a health care conflict and for
society far , more broadly than can in-hospital ethics consult
services. 70 0 In this, court decisions in cases addressing issues that
occasion significant conflict within society (such as those relating
to birth, pregnancy, and end-of-life questions) can encourage
society to examine its deepest assumptions. 70 ' At their best, the
distinct functions of ethics consult services and of courts can, and
should, complement each other.
692.
693.

Id. at i5l.
Use of this phrase in the remainder of this Part should be read to include ethics

committees.
694.

See generally Annas & Grodin, supra note 10.

695. See generally id.
696. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)
limitations of court review); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (N.J. 1976).
697. See Lightfoot, supra note 619, at 854.

(noting

698. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The
Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAMPBELL L. REv. 257, 271-72
(2009) [hereinafter Multi-InstitutionalHealthcare].

699.
700.
701.

See, e.g., supraParts II and III.
See Wilson, supranote 652, at 397-98.
See id. at 396-97.
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That complementation could be furthered through the
institutionalization of a method for ethics consult services and
courts, especially, in cases involving both, to communicate with
each other. Courts should be able to benefit from prior work done
by ethics consultants who attempted to respond to a conflict that
ultimately made its way to court. Court review of ethics consult
reports in cases that were entertained by a consult service before a
70 2
party sought legal redress should be encouraged and facilitated.
This would provide courts with valuable information about the
stakeholders involved in a health care conflict, their needs, beliefs,
and preferences, and about the framework (practical or
70
theoretical) within which the conflict at issue developed. s
Additionally, creating specialty or problem-solving courts to
respond to health care conflicts in hospitals and other health care
facilities has some merit as such courts would gain experience
dealing with health care conflicts. 704 However, even specialized
problem-solving courts are unlikely to provide an adequate
705
substitute for the work done by ethics consultants.
Problem-solving courts have achieved some success
responding to the needs of substance abusers, people with mental
illnesses, people who are homeless, and veterans who have been
accused of minor crimes. 70" The legal system has also supported
the development of a few specialty courts that entertain civil
disputes. 707 In theory, problem-solving specialty courts could be

702.

Jeffrey P. Spike, When Ethics Consultation and Courts Collide: A Case of Compelled

Treatment of a Mature Minor, I NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS 123, 130 (2011)
(recommending that a court hearing a case involving a health care conflict after review by
an ethics consultation should "include a review of the ethics consultation" in the court's
proceedings).
In most cases, court review of hospital ethics consult reports would require
703.
permission from the patient or the patient's surrogate. See Nicholas P. Terry, What's Wrong

With Health Privacy?, 5J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 15 (2009).
704.

See, e.g., Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots:Access to justice in

India'sLower Tier, 27 HARV. HUM. RTs.J. 151, 180 (2014) (noting that civil specialty court
judges may become experts in issues addressed by such courts).
705. See Multi-Institutional Healthcare, supra note 698, at 265-68 (discussing
multiple roles played by ethics consultation services in healthcare organizations).

706.
707.

the

See Eric R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1483 (2017).
A few states and municipalities have created civil specialty courts; they have

focused on business issues, tax issues, and commercial litigation. See Laurie Kratky Dord, If

You Build It, Will They Come? Designing Iowa's New Expedited Civil Action Rule and Related
Civil Justice Reforms, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 406, n.13 (2015); Tamar M. Meekins,
"Specialized Justice:" The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal

Defense Paradigm,40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 n. 7 (2006).
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constructed to respond to health care conflicts. That
development,7 0 8 however, would contain significant risks. It might
displace the most impressive components of the ethics
consultant's work that entails a focus on personhood and
relationship and the ability to devote many hours to achieving the
promises of that focus. 709
Courts, even specialized courts, are not likely to have the
resources to sustain that focus and may flatten moral challenges by
shaping them to fit a legal mold.no Moreover, development of
specialized courts to handle cases occasioned by health care
conflicts could lead to the diminution of appellate review in such
cases. That risk is significant in this domain of cases insofar as
appellate court opinions have opened windows for debate through
which society has been encouraged to reconsider fundamental
values and reshape bioethical challenges. 7 1 Appellate courts can
review problem-solving court's procedures.1
However, the
majority of people who appear before judges in problem-solving
courts waive the right to appeal.
In practice, that limits the
capacity of the court system to construct appellate decisions that
can lead to re-shaping legal and communal visions of far-reaching
social challenges.
Continuing to rely on two parallel-largely separatesystems for resolving health care conflicts involves some waste and
uncertainty, but the benefits of preserving both contexts for
dispute resolution are significant.7 14 When done well, ethics
708. The creation of such courts does not seem likely. Among other things, there are
probably not enough bioethics conflicts within local hospitals to justify the creation of a
specialty court in most jurisdictions. Further, civil specialty courts, although not novel, are
few and far between and have tended to focus their work around tax and commercial

questions. See Meekins, supra note 707, at 3 n.7.
709. See Matthew Bierlein, Seeing the Face of the Patient: Considerations in Applying
Bioethics Mediation to Non-Competent End-of-Life Decisionmaking, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.

Resol. 61, 87 (2007) (discussing use of person-centered approaches within ethics
consultation decision-making).
710. Hendrick, supra note 32, at i50.
711. Susan M. Wolf, Law & Bioethics: From Values to Violence, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
293, 294 (2004).
712. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
956 (2003).
713. Id. (noting that "participants in problem-solving courts may take the view that
appeals to higher authority are a form of adversarial behavior best left in the zero-sum
world of litigated cases rather than in the collaborative new world").
714. See Bierlein, supra note 709, at 87 (acknowledging differing, but complementary,
roles for ethics consultation and the courts); supra Part IV.
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consult services offer patients, their families, clinicians, and other
hospital staff an opportunity to resolve conflicts through a process
that depends on respect for the value and dignity of each
stakeholder.7 1 5 Few courts, if any, even among problem-solving
courts, have the resources or institutional capacity to do
comparable work.1 Yet, court review of health care conflicts is an
essential component of shaping a wiser health care system-one
attuned to fair process and constitutional rights in responding to
717
bioethical challenges.

VI. CONCLUSION

Only in the last three or four decades have ethics consult
services been widely available in hospitals and other health care
facilities.7 1' The ASBH Task Force delineated "core competencies"
that aim to ensure "quality improvement in ethics consultation. "719
These competencies were intended to serve as voluntary
guidelines. 72 0
Commentators questioned the status and value of a
presumptive profession without professional status, without
7 1
mandatory rules, and without accreditation demands. 1 Giles
Scofield suggests:
[I]t makes eminent sense to heed Paul Starr's
advice, which is that we should not simply take the
field's claims at face value, but that we should
instead be skeptical of, question, and even
challenge both the claims and the denials that the
field's practitioners make, both in terms of what
they say about themselves and in terms of what they
722
insinuate about the rest of us.
715.

See, e.g., supra Parts II and III.

716.

See generally James A. Dator, Futures and Trial Courts, 18 WIDENER L.J. 517, 521

(2009) (discussing the limitations of trial courts).
717.

See generally Gerard

Anderson,

The

Courts and Health Policy: Strengths and

Limitations, 11 HEALTH AFF. 95 (1992).
718.

Scott, supra note 5, at 365.

719.

ASBH, CORE COMPETENCIES, supra note 33, at 11.

720.

Id. at 31. Until recently, the Task Force did not "wish certifying or accrediting

bodies to mandate any portion of its report." Id.

721.
722.

Scofield, supra note 34, at 96-97.
Id. at 99.
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Recently, the American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities (ASBH) has developed and recommended use of a
"healthcare ethics certification examination."7 2 1 The exam tests
five areas of skill development: "assessment, analysis, process,
evaluation, and quality improvement" as well as "foundational
knowledge," deemed important to the work of clinical ethicists. 724
Work toward this article commenced with the sort of
skepticism that Scofield recommends. However, careful attention
to the Brookside ethics consult reports, only a small percent of
which are expressly considered in this article, dissipated most of
that skepticism. That said, no claims are made here about the
work of ethics consult services in general. It is noted only that one
consult service, developed along guidelines in harmony with those
recommended by the ASBH Task Force, has performed
impressively, serving a useful function.7 ' The service's work is
labor intensive and can be expensive.72' However, the benefits for
each of the stakeholders in cases occasioned by health care
conflicts in hospitals and other health care settings are
significant.72 7 Simply avoiding litigation, one outcome of a
successful ethics consultation, can balance the costs of sustaining a
consult service.72' Litigation is expensive, public, and timeconsuming.

72 9

Thus, ethics consult services and courts of law offer
complementary modes of responding to health care conflicts in
hospitals and other health care facilities. Each approach serves a
set of essential functions not served by the other. Neither should
be displaced by the other. Deliberation among those internal to

723.

ASBH,

Healthcare Ethics Consultation Certification (HEC-C) Examination Content

Outline, http://asbh.org/cerification/content-outline (last visited June 11, 2018) (noting
that "[t]he 2017 ASBH Role Delineation Study and needs assessment are the key
documents used to create the HEC-C examination content outline").

724.

Id.

725.

See ASBH, CORE COMPETENCIES, supra note 33.

726. As a general matter, patients only indirectly bear the costs of ethics consults. It
has proven difficult to assess the "value" of ethics consults. But see Mark Repenshek,
Assessing ROI for Clinical Ethics Consultation Services, HEALTH CARE ETHICS USA 12, 18

(2017) (measuring effects of ethics consultations on "established quality metrics").
727. See supra Parts II and Ill.
728. See Spike, supra note 702, at 130.
729. Id.
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each of these approaches should include constant reference to
and self-adjustments in light of the results of the other approach.

